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I. INTRODUCTION
Legal scholars and academics draw a distinction between "classical
contract" and "modem contract" that, for the most part, turns on the
differences between the two systems. 2  For example, the classical
1. Law is cyclical. JAY M. FEINMAN, UN-MAKING LAW 2-3 (2004) [hereinafter FEINMAN,
UN-MAKING]. That is, there is usually a period of legitimization, followed by a period of
critique/deconstruction, and then a reconstruction, which is legitimized, only to be followed again
by critique, etc. Contract law is no different. Schematically, an abbreviated version of the
evolution of contract law looks like this: Legitimization: Classical Legal Thought (1860s-
1930s) -- Critique: e.g., the Progressives, Legal Realism (1890s-1940s) -
Reconstruction/Legitimization: Modem Contract Law (1930s-1990s) - Critique: e.g., law
and economics, Critical Legal Studies, relational contract theory, feminist legal theory, behavioral
law and economics (1960s-present) - Reconstruction/Legitimization: Post-Modem Contract
Law (1990s-present). But see Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory
Estoppel, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1191, 1193 (1998) [hereinafter Knapp, Reliance] (noting different
ti meframes).
My Article focuses on part of this debate, namely, on the evolution of the classical to modem
contract law systems. This is because my claims center on the contract law framework, meaning
the background assumptions and rules governing how contracts work that evolved in this time
period. I argue that this framework remains in place today, notwithstanding the critiques
producing post-modem contract law. Consequently, the claims I make in this Article are as
applicable to the post-modem contract law system as they are to the "modem" one that I
specifically discuss. Indeed, my claims are probably more cogent as applied to post-modem
contract law, given that this system revives much of the classical formalism rejected by modem
contract. See Jay M. Feinman, Un-Making Law: The Classical Revival in the Common Law, 28
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 16 (2004) [hereinafter Feinman, Revival] ("Under the classical revival,
formality reigns at two levels. First, the contract doctrine itself becomes more formal: ostensibly
clear, rigid rules are favored over flexible standards. Second, the substance of the rules favors
formality in contracting practices."); Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet
Revolution in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 774 (2002) [hereinafter Knapp, Private]
(explaining that post-modem contract law "embraced with fervor all the earlier-disdained
incidents of classical formalism-the 'duty to read,' the 'plain meaning' rule, a vigorous parol
evidence rule, a high tolerance for 'puffing,' etc.-with the effect, intended or not, of reducing or
eliminating any constraints on the activities of the drafters of form contracts." (internal citations
omitted)); Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 OR. L. REV. 1131,
1133-34 (1995) ("[T]he 1980s and early 1990s resurrected many of the conceptualist abstractions
of classical contract law .... By 'conceptualism,' I mean a style of legal thought and reasoning
that emphasizes definitions, categories, and syllogistic logic."). For internal consistency and to
avoid confusion in nomenclature, however, I will refer to the contract law system that I am
critiquing as "modem" contract law.
2. For a discussion of the differences between classical and modem contract law see generally
P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979); BRUCE W. FRIER &
JAMES J. WHITE, THE MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS 306 (2d ed. 2008); Melvin Aron Eisenberg,
The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1743, 1749 (2000) [hereinafter
Eisenberg, Dynamic]; Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Revocation of Offers, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 271
(2004) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Offers]; Jay M. Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30
UCLA L. REV. 829 (1983) [hereinafter Feinman, Critical]; Charles L. Knapp, An Offer You Can't
Revoke, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 309 (2004) [hereinafter Knapp, Offer]; Knapp, Reliance, supra note I
at 1192; Blake D. Morant, The Relevance of Race and Disparity in Discussions of Contract Law,
31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 889, 897 (1997) [hereinafter Morant, Race]; Richard E. Speidel,
Afterword: The Shifting Domain of Contract, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 254 (1995).
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system relies on technical and rigid rules, whereas the modern system
has shifted to more flexible standards. Modern contract, unlike the
classical system, also attempts to effectuate the norms of fairness and
cooperation. And the list goes on.
Conventional wisdom holds that: (1) modern contract law evolved, at
least in part, to remedy problems created or left unaddressed by the
classical contract law system;3 (2) modem contract law is different from
classical contract law in ways that make the current system work better
than the older regime, that is, in ways that attempt to rectify some of
those problems;4 and, therefore, (3) it is the differences between the two
systems that are the most important part of the contract evolutionary
story.5  Whether this conventional wisdom is true depends upon
whether modern contract has been successful in correcting the problems
produced by the classical system. If it has not been successful, then the
conventional wisdom is wrong. And if the conventional wisdom is
wrong, then one could argue that at least parts of modern contract law
are no better than the classical contract system that it replaced, because
whatever problems modern contract perceived in the classical system
remain. This Article uses modern contract's expanded "policing
doctrines" to question the validity of this hypothesis.
3. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Responsive Model of Contract Law, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1107,
1108-11 (1984) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Responsive]; Feinman, Critical, supra note 2, at 830-39;
Feinman, Revival, supra note 1, at 12-14; Knapp, Offer, supra note 2, at 317-19; Charles L.
Knapp, Opting Out or Copping Out? An Argument for Strict Scrutiny of Individual Contracts, 40
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 95, 100-01 (2006) [hereinafter Knapp, Opting]; Knapp, Private, supra note 1;
Morant, Race, supra note 2, at 902. Cf JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., CONTRACTS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 6 (6th ed. 2006) [hereinafter MURRAY, CASES & MATERIALS] ("The principles of
contract law evolved from innumerable judicial decisions resolving countless disputes as part of
the common law of England. Contract law is, therefore, case law which continuously evolves and
sometimes modifies the principles of contract law which trace their roots to the sixteenth
century.") (footnotes omitted); Eisenberg, Dynamic, supra note 2, at 1753-54 (contrasting the
formal reasoning of classical contract law with the substantive reasoning of modern contract law).
4. FEINMAN, UN-MAKING, supra note 1, at 12-14; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Principles of
Consideration, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 640 (1982) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Consideration];
Feinman, Critical, supra note 2, at 830-39; Knapp, Offer, supra note 2, at 317-19; Knapp,
Opting, supra note 3, at 110. Accord MURRAY, CASES & MATERIALS, supra note 3, at 126-33
(discussing the transition from the classical to modern treatment of offers to form a unilateral
contract and, specifically, theories designed to make offers irrevocable upon part performance);
see also CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW 57 (6th ed. 2007) [hereinafter
KNAPP, CASEBOOK] (stating that in adopting different rules for unilateral contract formation,
"[t]he drafters of the Restatement [(Second) of Contracts] have attempted to ameliorate the harsh
results sometimes reached under the classical analysis.").
5. Feinman, Revival, supra note 1, at 12-14; Knapp, Offer, supra note 2, at 316-19; Morant,
Race, supra note 2, at 903; Speidel, supra note 2, at 260-61.
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More specifically, modem contract law gives expanded recognition
to several contract policing doctrines,6 namely, unconscionability,
economic duress, and misrepresentation. 7  Each of these doctrines
focuses on some type of bargaining misbehavior that produces a "bad
bargain" for one of the parties. All of these doctrines then attempt to
address the bargaining misbehavior by making the contract procured as
6. By "contract policing doctrines," I am referring to doctrines used by courts to police
contracts against, among other things, unfairness and/or bargaining misbehavior in the formation
process and inequity in the resulting terms. See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS
§§ 4.1, 4.9 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing the policing of contractual agreements).
7. Unconscionability, duress, and misrepresentation (fraud) were all recognized by the
classical legal system, if not before. See, e.g., Woburn Nat. Bank v. Woods, 89 A.491, 492 (N.H.
1914) (recognizing fraud); 28 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS §71:1 (4th ed. 2003) (citing works by Pollock & Maitland and Bracton that
recognize duress at English common law); Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent
Theory of Unconscionability: An Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1067,
1070-72 (2006) (detailing the history of unconscionability prior to codification in the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) and adoption by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts). All of these
policing doctrines, however, were given expanded recognition under modem contract law. See,
e.g., WILLISTON & LORD, supra, § 71:19 nn.9-15 (4th ed. 2003) (citing to numerous cases from
1936 through 2002, i.e., through the modem contract period [1930s-1990s] and beyond, to
demonstrate the doctrine of economic duress was recognized throughout the U.S.); DiMatteo &
Rich, supra, at 1072 ("The major impact of the codification of unconscionability in Article 2 was
its transformation from a remedy-limiting device to a substantive doctrine."); Knapp, Private,
supra note 1, at 771 (unconscionability); John A. Spanogle, Jr., Analyzing Unconscionability
Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931, 931 (1969) (unconscionability); see also RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 470 (1932) (recognizing claim for misrepresentation); STEWART
MACAULAY ET AL., CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION 435 (2003) (describing that, until the mid-
twentieth century, courts followed caveat emptor in a broad sense in contracting and other areas
of law but noting that there have since been a number of exceptions that have morphed into
modern-day misrepresentation); Candace Zierdt & Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate Deferred
Prosecutions Through the Looking Glass of Contract Policing, 96 Ky. L.J. 1, 26-27 (2007)
(discussing emergence of economic duress). These doctrines are recognized and expanded upon
in modem contract law. See Blake D. Morant, The Salience of Power in the Regulation of
Bargains: Procedural Unconscionability and the Importance of Context, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV.
925, 928 [hereinafter Morant, Salience] (recognizing unconscionability as a modem contract law
doctrine); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 161 (nondisclosure as equivalent
to misrepresentation), 164 (misrepresentation), 175 (duress), 175 cmt. a (economic duress), 176
(improper threats), & 208 (unconscionability) (1981); accord Larry A. DiMatteo, Equity's
Modification of Contract: An Analysis of the Twentieth Century's Equitable Reformation of
Contract Law, 33 NEW ENG. L. REV. 265, 281-97 (1999); Michael J. Herbert, Unconscionability
Under Article 2A, 21 U. TOL. L. REV. 715, 726 (1990) (recognizing misrepresentation as a
modem contract law doctrine); Julian S. Lim, Tongue-Tied in the Market: The Relevance of
Contract Law to Racial-Language Minorities, 91 CAL. L. REV. 579, 592 (2003); Kevin M.
Teeven, Consensual Path to Abolition of Preexisting Duty Rule, 34 VAL. U. L. REV. 43, 67
(1999); Debora L. Threedy, Labor Disputes in Contract Law: The Past and Present of Alaska
Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 65, 72 (2003) (recognizing economic
duress as a modem contract law doctrine).
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a result of the misbehavior voidable8 or otherwise unenforceable in
whole or in part.9
While the type of bargaining misbehavior targeted by each of the
expanded policing doctrines varies, all can be characterized as a form of
"coercion," meaning that one party is compelled or forced by another to
do what her free will would otherwise refuse. 10 So, for example,
unconscionability focuses on one party's improper use of its unequal
bargaining power and/or unfair and deceptive tactics; 11 economic duress
is directed at conduct where one party causes, or at least takes
advantage of, the other party's financial distress;12  and
misrepresentation addresses situations where one party presents (or
withholds) material information to (or from) the other party incorrectly,
improperly, and/or fraudulently. 13 In each of these coercive situations,
the end result-indeed the objective of the coercive conduct-is to
procure a "bad bargain."'14 Hence, the act to which a party is
''compelled or forced by another to do what her free will would
otherwise refuse" is agreeing to the bad bargain.
8. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1) (1981) ("If a party's
manifestation of assent is induced by either a fraudulent or material misrepresentation by the
other party upon which the recipient is justified in relying, the contract is voidable by the
recipient."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (1981) ("If a party's
manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim
no reasonable alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim.").
9. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) ("If a contract or term thereof is
unconscionable ... a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of
the contract without the unconscionable term ....").
10. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 258 (8th ed. 2004).
11. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
("Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on
the part of one of the parties together which contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to
the other party."); Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487-88 (1967) (discussing unconscionability and Section 2-302
of the Uniform Commercial Code).
12. See, e.g., Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 926-27 (7th Cir. 1983)
(holding that other party must cause the financial hardship); accord N. Fabrication Co. v.
UNOCAL, 980 P.2d 958 (Alaska 1999). But see Rich & Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton Dev. Inc., 204
Cal. Rptr. 86, 89 (Ct. App. 1984) (finding that it is enough that one party takes advantage of the
other side's financial circumstances). See generally John P. Dawson, Economic Duress-An
Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REV. 253 (1947) (discussing the boundaries of common law
duress).
13. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 164(1) (providing that a contract is
voidable if a party's "manifestation of assent is induced by either a fraudulent or material
misrepresentation .. ."), 162(1) (defining a fraudulent misrepresentation), 162(2) (defining
material misrepresentation), 161 (non-disclosure as the equivalent of a misrepresentation) (1981).
14. I am defining a "bad bargain" to mean one in which the terms unreasonably favor one
party. This definition is traditionally the one used to define substantive unconscionability. See,
e.g., Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d at 449.
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Since a bad bargain is a necessary part of the coercion problem, it
warrants further explanation. An underlying assumption of this analysis
is that the contracting parties came together for some reason: Party B
has what Party A wants or needs, whether a good or service, and Party
A is willing to pay for it. In other words, neither party was forced to
come to the bargaining table under false pretenses. 15 Now, let us
assume further that the contract terms are fair and reasonable. Given
that Party A wants and/or needs the good or service at issue and came to
the bargaining table willingly, why would Party B have to coerce Party
A to enter that contract? Absent any coercion on Party B's part, there is
clearly no legal claim presented on these facts, given that the contract
terms are fair and reasonable and no false pretenses were used. An
argument could be made, however, that Party B might want the
additional sale to Party A at any cost. To realize on the additional sale
to Party A, therefore, Party B might employ sales tactics to persuade
Party A to enter into the fair and reasonable contract.
So, let us assume that Party B uses sales tactics that, unbeknownst to
Party B, constitute actionable coercion, 16 and that those sales tactics
coerced Party A to enter into a fair and reasonable contract. Is a legal
problem presented? To be sure, there is always the principle at stake,
namely, that people should not be wrongfully induced to enter into a
contract. In fact, permitting such a situation to occur would violate a
cardinal principle of contract law, specifically, that a contract is a
voluntary undertaking. In addition, there is nothing in a claim for
economic duress or misrepresentation, for example, that explicitly
requires something to be substantively wrong with the contract. 17
15. I am distinguishing the scenario I describe in the text from the fraud in the factum
situation, where Party A, who only speaks Spanish, is told in Spanish that she is buying a
refrigerator, but the written contract, all in English, indicates that she is actually buying a car; or
when Party A is told she is signing a letter when the document is actually a mortgage. In cases of
fraud in the factum, one party is misled into corning to the bargaining table. Contracts obtained
in this fashion are void ab initio. In these situations, "the other party neither knows nor has
reason to know the character of the proposed agreement," and, therefore, "the effect of such
misrepresentation is that there is no contract at all." FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, §4. 10; see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 163 (1981).
16. By "actionable coercion," I am referring to wrongful conduct by one of the parties that
would give rise to a legally cognizable contract claim or defense based on one of the policing
doctrines I discuss in the text. In other words, under the law, Party B's actions in my hypothetical
would be deemed legal coercion. But this is not the same thing as saying Party B knows or even
thinks he coerced Party A. If Party B disagrees with Party A's characterization of his actions,
you have a legal dispute and a lawyer could take this case without violating any ethical rules.
17. A claim for misrepresentation, for example, includes the following elements: (1) a
fraudulent or material misrepresentation; (2) the misrepresentation must have induced the
recipient to enter the contract; and (3) the recipient's reliance on the misrepresentation must be
justified. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 7, introductory note (1981). The elements
[Vol. 41
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Legally, therefore, Party A has a claim or, more likely, a defense,
against Party B for the latter's coercive conduct. 18 If, however, Party A
wants and/or needs the goods or service, and the terms are reasonable
and fair, how realistic is it that Party A would end up challenging the
contract or not performing her end of the bargain, even in the face of
coercive conduct by Party B? 19 More pragmatically, without something
substantively wrong with the contract, what attorney would take that
case? In either event, it seems highly unlikely that a lawsuit (with Party
A as the plaintiff or, more likely, as the defendant) would arise.20
The only way coercion presents an actionable problem, therefore, is if
it results in a bad bargain. Thus, coercion plus a bad bargain is what the
modem contract law system identifies as a problem created, or at least
not adequately addressed, by the classical system. This coercion-plus-
of economic duress are: (1) a wrongful or improper threat; (2) no reasonable alternative but to
accede to the threat; and (3) the improper threat induces the making of the contract.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175. cmts. a-c (1981). Although Section 176(2) of
the Restatement defines an improper threat to include one where the resulting exchange is not on
fair terms, an improper threat is not limited to this situation. In other words, a threat may be
improper even if the resulting contract is substantively fair. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 176(1) (1981).
18. For example, Party A could sue Party B to challenge the validity of their contract based on
Party B's coercion. Or, in the more likely scenario, Party A could simply not perform her
contract, force Party B to sue her for breach of contract, and then raise Party B's coercion as a
defense.
19. Even assuming Party A prevailed in a lawsuit, what would be Party A's damages? Party
A, in other words, could have the contract rescinded based on misrepresentation or duress, or
found unenforceable in whole or in part based on unconscionability. Party A would not be filing
a breach of contract action or counterclaim, and only a breach of contract claim results in
damages. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 346(1) (1981) ("The injured party has
a right to damages for any breach by a party against whom the contract is enforceable .... ");
Julien Ross, A Fair Day's Pay: The Problem of Unpaid Workers in Central Texas, 10 TEX. HISP.
J.L. & POL'Y 117, 137 (2004) ("Generally, the nonbreaching party's remedy for breach of contract
is money damages that will put the nonbreaching party in the position it would have enjoyed if
the contract had been performed."). Party A would be entitled to restitution damages, see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 376 (1981), but I do not think a restitution claim
would be filed, because such a claim would be subject to offset by Party B for the reasonable
value Party A received as a result of the contract. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 376, illus. 4 (1981).
20. One could argue that if Party A is coerced into a set of terms that is reasonable and fair but
more favorable to Party B, Party A would have both a subjective reason to challenge (or not
perform) the contract and an objective justification to do so. I agree with the general proposition
that Party A would have a legal claim or defense against Party B, based on Party B's coercion.
My response, however, is a pragmatic one-such a lawsuit, either by Party A or by Party B,
would simply not arise because: (1) it is not going to be hard for Party B to prove that a contract
was formed, see infra Part m.B.3; (2) practically speaking the burden on Party A of trying to
prove the coercion, either as part of a claim or a defense, would be almost insurmountable, see
infra Part III.B.4; and, (3) an attorney would not likely take the case, given that the terms of the
contract are reasonable and fair. The more likely outcome, therefore, is that Party A would
perform the contract.
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bad-bargain problem is what the modem system attempts to remedy via
its expanded contract policing doctrines.2 1  Absent the gap left by
classical contract, there would be no reason for modem contract law to
adopt the expanded policing doctrines. 22
The problem is that modern contract's solution to the coercion/bad
bargain problem does not work. In fact, the modem system makes the
coercion problem worse because the modem system only partially
rejects classical contract while retaining key parts of the older regime.
Specifically, modem contract law left the core of classical contract,
which is contract formation, completely intact. And contract formation,
particularly in the doctrine of mutual assent, is where the power in
contracting is created, embedded, and, under modem contract law,
largely immunized from effective challenge by the contract policing
doctrines. By leaving the core of contract intact, modem contract law
has ensured that the expanded policing doctrines it adopted will not
alleviate, let alone correct, the coercion problem.
Consequently, conventional wisdom, which says, in part, that modem
contract law is different from classical contract law in ways that make
the current system work better than the older regime, is wrong. Instead,
the ways in which the two systems are the same are more critical,
because it is this sameness that determines whether modem contract law
will be successful in remedying the problems it identified under the
classical system. My examination in this Article of modem contract's
21. I need to make clear up front that I am just identifying one problem (coercion plus a bad
bargain) and the solution that modem contract law came up with to remedy it (i.e., its expanded
contract policing doctrines). Other policing doctrines were recognized by classical contract law,
i.e., duress, undue influence, minority, and mental incapacity. See WILLISTON & LORD, supra
note 7, §§ 9:5 n.4 (noting numerous cases from as early as the mid to late 1800s recognizing the
minority doctrine in contract law), 10:3 n.7 (using cases from the 1880s to illustrate the rule for
mental incapacity); see also supra note 12 and accompanying text (duress); Dawson, supra note
12, at 258 (discussing development of undue influence and referring to 19th century cases to
emphasize his points). The existence of these other (or "traditional") policing doctrines under
classical contract law demonstrates that the classical system was aware that coercion existed in
contract formation and/or that contracts needed to be policed for other reasons, i.e., the status of
one of the parties was entitled to special solicitude. I am not focusing on any of the traditional
doctrines, however, for the following reason: conventional wisdom says that the differences in
modem contract law were supposed to correct the classical contract problems. I am, therefore,
only focusing on the policing doctrines to which modem contract gave expanded recognition.
The expanded policing doctrines, in other words, are the modem solution to the classical coercion
problem. At the same time, because all of the traditional contract policing doctrines are
peripheral to the core of contract, which is formation, they would also be subject to the process
problem I discuss in detail later in the article; and they, too, will be largely ineffectual in
correcting the problems they are intended and/or designed to address.
22. Blake D. Morant, The Teachings of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Contract Theory: An
Intriguing Comparison, 50 ALA. L. REv. 63,70-71 (1998) [hereinafter Morant, MLK].
[Vol. 41
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policing doctrines will show that modem contract will not achieve this
remedial goal. So, while an exploration of specific proposals to address
this deficiency is outside the scope of this Article,23 I do advance the
proposition that the modem contract law system is not working the way
it should be.
In Part II of this Article, I set out the evolution of the classical to
modem contract law system. In particular, Part II.A describes classical
legal thought in some detail, because understanding this older regime is
vital as it provides the backdrop against which my discussion of modem
contract law takes place. Part lI.B focuses on the modem system and,
more specifically, on the conventional wisdom, which holds that the
differences between the classical and modem systems are the most
important part of the evolutionary story.
In Part III, I argue that the modem contract solution to the coercion
problem will fail. Part III.A disputes the conventional wisdom of Part II
and argues that the ways in which the two contract law systems are the
same are actually more critical to understanding whether the modem
system will be successful in solving the coercion problem produced by
the classical system. Part III.B sets out in detail my theory that the seat
of power in contract is formation, primarily in the element of mutual
assent. I argue that mutual assent is key because this is where most
material terms are decided. This is also where the critical decision of
whether to enter into the contract is made. If the parties assent to enter
the contract, then a contract is formed.24 At that point, the state
effectively steps in and says that the parties are bound to the contract.
"Being bound" to the contract creates a presumption of contract (and
term) validity that the coerced party has the burden of overcoming. 25
Unfortunately, this presumption is extremely difficult to overcome,
because of what I identify as the "process problem."26 Consequently,
satisfying the elements of contract formation means that a coerced party
is literally bound to the bad bargain, one that the state, at that point, will
compel the coerced party to either pay to get out of or perform. 27
Modem contract law failed to change formation, except to make it
easier to form a contract. By making contract formation easier, I argue
that the modern system actually expands one party's capacity to coerce
23. 1 will undertake to do so, however, in a later article. In this Article, I am examining the
question of whether the modem contract law system is flawed and/or not working well.
24. A contract would be formed upon assent, because consideration is generally present in
market transactions. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 2.2; see also infra Parts III.B.3 & 4.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 162-207.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 208-21.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 222-23.
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her contracting partner. And, by leaving the core (formation) intact,
modem contract law also largely immunizes this expanded capacity for
coercion from effective challenge by the policing doctrines it ostensibly
adopted to remedy it. In other words, modem contract law's failure to
change the core of classical contract serves both to increase and protect
one party's ability to coerce her contracting partner during contract
formation. Ironically, by preserving the core, modem contract law
precludes the policing doctrines from protecting the victims of
contractual coercion. Thus, the modern system does not adequately
solve the coercion problem. It actually makes it worse.
Finally, I briefly conclude in Part IV with what should be obvious
even now, namely, that conventional contract wisdom, which focuses
on the differences rather than the sameness between classical and
modern contract law, is wrong. Because this conventional wisdom
expresses our own beliefs about how modem contract law should work,
the fact that the wisdom is wrong demonstrates that modem contract
simply cannot work in the way that we assert that it should.
II. THE EVOLUTIONARY STORY
2 8
This Part sets out the backdrop for the rest of the Article. That
backdrop consists of the classical legal system, discussed in Part II.A,
and the contract conventional wisdom that says that the differences
between the classical and modem systems are more important than the
ways in which the two systems are the same, discussed in Part ll.B.
A. Classical Legal Thought
Classical legal thought was formulated in the 1860s and dominated
most American legal institutions until the 1930s. 29 It was characterized
28. This version of the evolution of contract law is not without its critics. Professor Roy
Kreitner, for example, argues that the tendency to read the history of contract law as an
evolutionary process in which "contract was always about 'individuals creating their own
obligations' is 'ahistorical and thus in some sense a distortion'... [.]" ROY KREITNER,
CALCULATING PROMISES 7 (2007). Instead, he states, "a particular view of contract (as
individual-centered) and a particular view of the individual (as calculating, calculable,
autonomous) are actually mutually reinforcing effects of historical processes." Id. at 6. I do not
necessarily disagree with Professor Kreitner. But a substantive engagement of his theory is not
necessary to my Article. Professor Kreitner himself concedes that the "current frame for the
modem discourse of contract ... is the private ordering paradigm." Id. at 3. I do not challenge
the existing framework of contract law in this Article. Instead, I accept it as a given and try to
determine whether the rules of contract law actually work within that framework, that is, on their
own terms.
29. AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, at xi (Fisher, Horwitz & Reed eds., 1993) [hereinafter
LEGAL REALISM]; see Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 478
(1988) [hereinafter Singer, Realism] (setting the time period of classical legal thought as 1860-
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by abstract, formal, and rigid rules that applied to all cases, regardless
of subject matter or party. 30 Broad application of these rules to all cases
meant that the context within which a transaction took place was largely
irrelevant. 31 The classical legal system was also structured around a
series of dichotomies, 32 the most important of which was the one
between public and private law.33 The mechanism that the classical
legal system used to ensure that the two spheres would remain
completely segregated was the idea of a self-regulating market. 34
The classical legal theorists' model of the market assumed that value
was subjective 35 and that everything was capable and, hence, subject to
the exigencies of money exchange. 36 Thus, the function of market-
based exchange was to maximize the conflicting desires of atomistic
individuals seeking to promote their own self-interest. 37 This idea of
the self-regulating market was then incorporated into the private half of
the public/private dichotomy. 38
In the private law sphere of private action, individuals exercised
rights,39 and contract law was the core of the private law system.40 To
1940). But see Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS
OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 28 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998) [hereinafter Mensch,
History] (setting the time period as 1885-1935).
30. These abstract, formal rules were an attempt to create more predictable "justice." See
LEGAL REALISM, supra note 29, at xi-xii; ATIYAH, supra note 2, at 402; Eisenberg, Offers, supra
note 2, at 281; Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, The Emergence of Promissory Estoppel
as an Independent Theory of Recovery, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 472, 501 (1983); Jay M. Feinman,
Contract After the Fall, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1537 (1987) (book review) [hereinafter Feinman, Fall].
31. Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Law, 94 YALE L.J. 997, 1010
(1985); Mensch, History, supra note 29, at 30.
32. See Jay M. Feinman, The Significance of Contract Theory, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1286
(1990) [hereinafter Feinman, Theory] ("For example, the federal government and state
governments had separate spheres of authority, as did legislatures and courts.").
33. Id.
34. Elizabeth Mensch, Freedom of Contract as Ideology, 33 STAN. L. REV. 753, 757 (1981)
[hereinafter Mensch, Ideology]; Singer, Realism, supra note 29, at 477-82. See generally
ATIYAH, supra note 2, at 402 (noting that "the emphasis on contract law as the law of the market
was, in England at least, well established by 1870, although in America it may have been a later
development."); Morton J. Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87
HARV. L. REV. 917, 936-52 (1974) [hereinafter Horwitz, Foundations] (discussing the basis for
development of modern contract law).
35. Horwitz, Foundations, supra note 34, at 947.
36. Peter Gabel & Jay Feinman, Contract Law as Ideology, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 500
(David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998).
37. Horwitz, Foundations, supra note 34, at 947.
38. Cf. FEINMAN, UN-MAKING, supra note 1, at 7 ("Society was organized and controlled by
two institutions: the market and the state. The market was primary; through it, people could
maximize their potential, realize their dreams, and rise or fall on their own merits."); Singer,
Realism, supra note 29, at 479, 481-82.
39. Singer, Realism, supra note 29, at 478.
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the classical theorists, contract law was a system "conceived of as a
field of private ordering in which parties created their own law by
agreement," 4 1 and within this realm of private agreement, individual
freedom was protected from state coercion. 42 In effect, this meant that,
within the private law sphere, individuals were free to agree on
whatever contract terms they wanted,43 and the state would ostensibly
play no role in regulating the substantive terms of those private
relations. 44  This, of course, is the very classical notion of freedom of
contract.
45
Indeed, the role of the courts under the private law system was to
enforce the bargain of the parties as made.46  Courts were to ensure
procedural fair play, but nothing more. 47
The reasons for the minimalist role assigned to the courts, and to the
state, were threefold. First, liability could only be voluntarily assumed
by the individuals themselves. 48 That is, individuals could not be forced
40. Id. at 481.
41. Feinman, Critical, supra note 2, at 831.
42. Feinman, Theory, supra note 32, at 1286.
43. ATIYAH, supra note 2, at 403; Singer, Realism, supra note 29, at 479.
44. LEGAL REALISM, supra note 29, at 99; Singer, Realism, supra note 29, at 479.
45. See, e.g., Samuel Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L. REV. 365, 373 (1921).
46. See LEGAL REALISM, supra note 29, at 98-99 (explaining the critique of the public/private
distinction in American Legal Realism); Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive Theory of Contract:
From Feminist Dilemmas to a Reconceptualization of Rational Choice in Contract Law, 146 U.
PA. L. REV. 1235, 1262 (1998) ("[L]aw aims exclusively to give effect to the arrangements and to
protect the interests voluntarily created by contracting parties."); Singer, Realism, supra note 29,
at 479; see also ATIYAH, supra note 2, at 404 (According to Atiyah, the court's only function was
to "ensure procedural fair play ... [. It is not the Court's business to ensure that the bargain is
fair, or to see that one party does not take undue advantage of another, or impose unreasonable
terms by virtue of superior bargaining position."); Dalton, supra note 31, at 1010.
47. LEGAL REALISM, supra note 29, at 99; ATIYAH, supra note 2, at 404; FEINMAN, UN-
MAKING, supra note 1, at I 11; Dalton, supra note 31, at 1014.
[O]ur principal vision of contract law is still one of a neutral facilitator of private
volition. We understand that contract law is concerned at the periphery with the
imposition of social duties . . . [b]ut we conceive the central arena to be an
unproblematic enforcement of obligations voluntarily undertaken .... Although we
concede that the law of contract is the result of public decisions about what agreements
to enforce, we insist that the overarching public decision is to respect and enforce
private intention.
Dalton, supra note 31, at 1014.
48. ATIYAH, supra note 2, at 403 (noting that the fourth principle of classical contract law is
that, "the deal is finally struck when the parties agree, or indicate their agreement .... The
agreement must be 'freely' made and 'without pressure' but these concepts are very narrowly
interpreted, for they must not conflict with the rule of the market place[.]"); Hadfield, supra note
46, at 1247 ("Contract law proceeds from the premise that obligation is established by the
existence of voluntary and informed choice to enter into a contract."); Morant, Race, supra note
2, at 904 ("Consensual arrangements should be enforced if the parties' entry into the bargain was
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to enter into a contract; 49 they were free to contract only if they wished
to do so.50 Second, the individuals themselves were deemed to be
roughly equal to each other in terms of bargaining power 51 and access
to information; 52 in addition, they bargained at arm's-length53 and were
self-interested. 54  It was assumed, moreover, that each individual was
the best judge of his own interests, knew his own circumstances, was
able to calculate all risks and future contingencies, and that all of these
considerations entered into the making of the contract.55  In other
words, individuals were rational actors. 56 Finally, the classical theorists
truly voluntary."); Singer, Realism, supra note 29, at 479 (arguing that the classical theorists
"considered three principles to be central to a free contract system[,]" one of which was the
principle that a party could not be forced to contract against her will).
49. ATIYAH, supra note 2, at 403; Singer, Realism, supra note 29, at 479.
50. ATIYAH, supra note 2, at 408 ("The autonomy of the free choice of private parties to make
their own contracts on their own terms was the central feature of classical contract law.");
Hadfield, supra note 46, at 1261 (viewing contracts as a form of private ordering means that
"individuals are free to choose the structure of their relationships without interference. In this
view, law does not judge the formation, performance, or breach of a contract on the basis of
external juristic values; law acts only as a surrogate for the values created by the parties
themselves."); Singer, Realism, supra note 29, at 479.
51. See, e.g., JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 429 (3d ed. 1987)
(stressing the ethic of self-reliance: "The self-reliance ethic presupposes, as a model, parties who
understand the legal consequences of the agreement and who have equal bargaining power or, at
least, who are equally free to refuse to bargain unless their terms are met.").
52. See, e.g., ATIYAH, supra note 2, at 403 (The third principal of the classical model of
contract law is that "neither party owes any duty to volunteer information to the other, nor is he
entitled to rely on the other except within the narrowest possible limits." Instead, each party must
"study the situation, examine the subject matter of the contract, and the general market situation,
assess the future probabilities, and rely on his own sources of information. He may take advice,
consult experts, buy information from third parties; but if he does not do so, he relies on his own
judgment and acts at his peril."); Speidel, supra note 2, at 264 ("At least initially, contemporary
contract doctrine assumes, as did classical doctrine, that the parties to an agreement had adequate
information and choice .. . [.]"); cf Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Interventions: Toward an
Expansive Equality Approach to the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 1025, 1042 (2003) ("In economic terms, a crucial condition of the ideal contracting
environment is that all contracting parties have access to 'full information about the nature and
consequences of [their] choice[s]."') (footnotes omitted).
53. See, e.g., ATIYAH, supra note 2, at 402-03.
The model of contract theory which implicitly underlay the classical law of contract..
• was thus the model of the market. Essentially this model is based on the following
principal features. First, the parties deal with each other 'at arm's length' . . . ; this
carries the notion that each relies on his own skill and judgment, and that neither owes
any fiduciary obligation to the other.
Id. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There Is No Law of Relational Contracts, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 805,
808 (2000) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Relational] ("[C]lassical contract law was implicitly based on
a paradigm of bargains made between strangers transacting in a perfect market.").
54. Feinman, Critical, supra note 2, at 832.
55. ATIYAH, supra note 2, at 403.
56. Eisenberg, Relational, supra note 53, at 808.
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believed that the self-regulating market was the great neutralizer.57
They believed that free competition in a self-regulated market, one
unencumbered by state interference either in the form of legislation or
court imposed obligations,58 would effectively and fairly mediate the
competing and conflicting desires of these self-interested individuals. 59
Implicit in this understanding of the market, therefore, was the
assumption that the market itself was neutral, impartial, and perfect. 60
Under the circumstances just described, the classical theorists were
able to conclude that the private law system would produce the "just"
result without the need for state involvement.6 1 Indeed, under this
scheme the state was simply not implicated and, therefore, had no role
to play "in the processes and outcomes of private life."'62 Here, free will
prevailed against state power.63  The core values thus given full
expression by the private law system, that is to say, by the private law
of contracts, were individual autonomy and liberty.64 But more than
this, the classical theorists reasoned that if this interpretation of state
power, with all of its limits, was respected, "the state [could not] fairly
be held responsible for the distribution of wealth and power in society-
that [was] for the outcomes of the voluntary transactions of private
parties." 65
Classical contract law was based on a rational-actor model of psychology, under which
actors who make decisions in the face of uncertainty rationally maximize their
subjective expected utility, with all future benefits and costs discounted to present
value. In particular, the rules of classical contract law were implicitly based on the
assumptions that actors are fully knowledgeable, know the law, and act rationally to
further their economic self-interest.
Id.; see also Hadfield, supra note 46, at 1236, 1255; supra text accompanying notes 39-47
(discussing the sphere of private law).
57. Feinman, Fall, supra note 30, at 1541.
58. Singer, Realism, supra note 29, at 479-80.
59. ATIYAH, supra note 2, at 404.
60. See also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV.
741, 746 (1982) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Bargain] (describing the four elements characterizing a
perfect market). See generally Eisenberg, Relational, supra note 53, at 808 ("[C]lassical contract
law was implicitly based on a paradigm of bargains made . . . in a perfect market."); Singer,
Realism, supra note 29, at 477-82 (detailing the history and evolution of the classical conception
of the self-regulating market).
61. LEGAL REALISM, supra note 29, at 99.
62. Dalton, supra note 31, at 1012-13; Singer, Realism, supra note 29, at 481.
63. Singer, Realism, supra note 29, at 481.
64. ATIYAH, supra note 2, at 408; Dalton, supra note 31, at 1010; Feinman, Fall, supra note
30, at 1543; Mensch, Ideology, supra note 34, at 753; Morant, MLK, supra note 22, at 90-91;
Morant, Race, supra note 2, at 902.
65. LEGAL REALISM, supra note 29, at 99.
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State imposed obligations did continue to exist but classical theorists
viewed these obligations as largely peripheral.66 Consequently, the only
arena in which the state was free to act was under the public part of the
public/private dichotomy. 67  In this public sphere of government
regulation, public officials could exercise state power, 68 and all state
imposed obligations, like quasi-contracts, torts, and real property, 69
were relegated to this sphere.70
The paradigm transaction under the classical legal system, therefore,
was a private law transaction-one unaffected by the context within
which it took place.7 1 To recap, that transaction was framed by all of
the following assumptions:
(1) Contract law was private, meaning it was a private transaction
between two private parties; 72
(2) Parties bargained at arm's length, so they were most likely
strangers to one another;73
(3) Parties had equal, or roughly equal, bargaining power;74
(4) Parties had equal access to information; 75
(5) Individuals acted as rational actors in the marketplace; 76
(6) Contracts were the product of voluntary and informed choice;77
(7) Contract law was the law of the market-implicit but central to
this understanding were the notions that markets were neutral and
impartial, and also perfect, self-regulating, and largely outside of state
control; 78 and
(8) The role of the state was neutral and minimal.79
66. Dalton, supra note 31, at 1010; Singer, Realism, supra note 29, at 479-81.
67. LEGAL REALISM, supra note 29, at 99; FEINMAN, UN-MAKING, supra note 1, at 11-12;
Singer, Realism, supra note 29, at 478-79.
68. Singer, Realism, supra note 29, at 478.
69. These two areas of private law were essentially reconceptualized as implicating only state
imposed obligations. Id. at 480-81.
70. Id.
71. See supra text accompanying note 3 1.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
74. See supra text accompanying note 51.
75. See supra text accompanying note 52.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50, 55.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 57-60.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 58, 61, 62; cf infra text accompanying notes 82-86
(arguing that under classical contract law contracts were in fact public due to state enforcement of
both individual contracts and market regulation).
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Perhaps not surprisingly, all of the classical legal system's
assumptions have been the subject of vigorous critiques. 80 The Legal
Realists, for example, attacked the public/private distinction upon which
much of classical legal thought was based. 81 Specifically, the Realists
argued that contracts were not the product of voluntary choice (or
assent) between two private parties, but were instead the product of
coercion that is ultimately created and permitted by the state.8 2 They
argued, moreover, that contracts were in fact public, not private,
because the state enforced them.83 The Realists also attacked as myth
80. See Feinman, Critical, supra note 2, at 832-33 ("Critiques focused on the inescapable
presence of policy choices which make contract law as much a realm of social ordering as other
areas of law, and the impossibility of realizing a formal rules system . . ."); Feinman, Theory,
supra note 32, at 1283-84 (noting that the perceived crisis in law generated a counter attack held
by mainstream scholars and practitioners); Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in
Context, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 737, 738 (2000) [hereinafter Feinman, Context] ("The essence of the
criticism of classical law ... was contextualism.").
81. What follows is an over-simplistic summary of the Legal Realist critique of the classical
legal system. For more thorough analyses see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW: 1870-1960 chs. 6-8 (Oxford Univ. Press 1992); Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of
Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1933) [hereinafter Cohen, Contract]; Morris R. Cohen,
Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8 (1927) [hereinafter Cohen, Property]; Dawson,
supra note 12; Robert Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38
POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923) [hereinafter Hale, Coercion]; Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-
An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L. J. 704 (1931); Singer, Realism, supra note 29; LEGAL
REALISM, supra note 29, ch. 4.
82. The Realists argued that coercion is ubiquitous and "lies at the heart of every bargain."
Hale, Coercion, supra note 81, at 470; Mensch, Ideology, supra note 34, at 764. In fact, every
contract involves mutual coercion, because each party is legally entitled to withhold from the
other what she owns, whether capital (i.e., land) or labor. Cohen, Property, supra note 81; Hale,
Coercion, supra note 81, at 472-74; Singer, Realism, supra note 29, at 486. Coercion, therefore,
stems from ownership; and the more one party owns (in terms of quantity and/or value), the more
that party will be able to dictate the terms of a contract. Cohen, Property, supra note 81; Hale,
Coercion, supra note 81, at 472-73; Mensch, Ideology, supra note 34, at 764; Singer, Realism,
supra note 29, at 486. "Ownership [in turn,] is a function of legal entitlement." Mensch, History,
supra note 29, at 35. This is because it is the state which creates and protects, for example, the
property right. Cohen, Property, supra note 81; Hale, Coercion, supra note 81, at 471-72;
Singer, Realism, supra note 29, at 487-88. Consequently, because coercion is a function of
ownership and ownership is a creature of the state, the state is deeply embedded in every
ostensibly private contract. Contracts are therefore public, not private.
83. There are at least two dimensions to the state enforcement of private contract argument.
The first involves the decision as to which contracts to enforce. The second involves the use of
state force. More specifically, contract law does not enforce every promise a person makes, it
only enforces some, leaving others to individual conscience or honor. Cohen, Contract, supra
note 81, at 585; Singer, Realism, supra note 29, at 485. Contract law is therefore public, under
this view, because deciding which promises should be enforceable and which left to conscience,
for example, "necessarily requires" courts and legislatures (to the extent that substantive
regulation of contract terms is involved) to make policy choices. Cohen, Contract, supra note 81,
at 585-86; Singer, Realism, supra note 29, at 485. Once the state (through its judges and
legislators) determines which contracts are enforceable, the state will then enforce those state
created contract rights by literally putting the sovereign power of the state in the service of one
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the idea of the self-regulating market by showing that the "free" market
was, in reality, a regulatory structure created by the state.84
Consequently, since the state was deeply involved in every "private"
contract, and because the market was itself a regulated structure created
by the state, the Realists argued persuasively that the public/private
distinction was an artificial construct. 85 As a result, the role of the state
in the distribution of wealth, property, and power in society could in no
way be deemed neutral or minimal.86
contracting party against the other. It accomplishes this by compelling one of the parties (through
its judges, sheriffs, and other state agents) to either pay or perform. Cohen, Contract, supra note
81, at 585-86; Singer, Realism, supra note 29, at 483-85. Contract law is therefore public, under
this view, because by choosing to enforce the contract (as opposed to not enforcing it), the state
has essentially chosen between two competing moral principles, namely, the right to rely on a
promise versus the freedom to change one's mind about whether to perform the contract. Cohen,
Contract, supra note 81, at 587; Feinman, Critical, supra note 2, at 841-42; Singer, Realism,
supra note 29, at 484-85.
84. Classical legal theorists assumed that every action within the private sphere they had so
painstakingly carved out for individual action was free and voluntary. See supra Part II.A.;
LEGAL REALISM, supra note 29, at 99-100. Consequently, any state action, whether in the form
of court decisions or legislation, constituted an unwarranted governmental intrusion into that
private sphere of action. See supra Part II.A.; LEGAL REALISM, supra note 29, at 99-100. The
Realists argued that this classical assumption was "fundamentally misguided." LEGAL REALISM,
supra note 29, at 99. According to the Realists, our existing and developing statutory and
common law created a comprehensive network of regulations. Id. at 99-100; Joseph William
Singer, Bussey Professor of Law, Harvard University: Things That We Would Like to Take for
Granted: Minimum Standards for the Legal Framework of a Fee and Democratic Society 10-11
(Nov. 7, 2006) (transcript on file with the author), reprinted in 2 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 139
(2008) [hereinafter Singer, Speech]. This network of legal rules set forth minimum standards for
contracting and, in so doing, effectively advantaged certain parties and disadvantaged others. Id.;
LEGAL REALISM, supra note 29, at 99. Regulation, in other words, provided both the foundation
and framework upon which the self-regulating, free market was built, operated, and continues to
operate. Singer, Speech, supra, at 11. In other words, absent the legal structure provided by
court and/or state imposed regulation, the self-regulating free market would be unrecognizable as
a market at all. Id. at 4. Consequently, the Legal Realists argued that the market itself was a
regulatory structure. Id.
85. LEGAL REALISM, supra note 29, at 99-100; Cohen, Property, supra note 81; Hale,
Coercion, supra note 81, at 471; Louis L. Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L.
REV. 201 (1937); Singer, Realism, supra note 29, at 482-95.
86. Professor Joseph Singer writes:
Once the state was created, it altered (or was intended to alter) the distribution of
power and wealth in society. Indeed, the whole purpose of legal rights was to impose
collective limits on individuals' freedom of action in order to protect the interests of
others. Moreover, even by failing to intervene in "private" transactions, the state
effectively altered contract relations; it delegated to the more powerful party the
freedom to exercise her superior power or knowledge over the weaker party. Thus, the
state determined the distribution of power and wealth in society both when it acted to
limit freedom and when it failed to limit the freedom of some to dominate others.
Singer, Realism, supra note 29, at 482; see also Cohen, Property, supra note 81, at 11-13.
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The critiques of the classical legal system focused on several things,
including the unmistakable presence of policy choices in the ostensibly
private law area of contract, "on the impossibility of realizing a formal
rules system, and on the considerable gap between the idealized vision
of the world and the actual operation of contract law in society." 87 The
classical system was clearly flawed. The real issue, then, was to decide
what to do about it.
B. Modern Contract and Conventional Wisdom-The Differences
Matter
Academics developed the modem legal system in response to all of
the foregoing criticism. 88 Modem law, and particularly modem contract
law, is a specific attempt to resolve some of the problems that led to the
collapse of classical legal thought. 89
For example, modem contract law shifts away from formal rules, like
offer and acceptance, 90 to legal standards, 91 like reliance, that required
courts to derive facts and meaning from the surrounding
circumstances. 92 It also recognizes that the market is not perfect93 and,
in fact, contains anomalies in the form of informational asymmetries
and other bargaining inequalities. 94 In addition, the context within
87. Eisenberg, Offers, supra note 2, at 281-82; Feinman, Critical, supra note 2, at 833
(internal citations omitted); Feinman, Theory, supra note 32, at 1286-87.
88. See supra note 2.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 2-22.
90. See infra Part IIH.B.3; Feinman, Theory, supra note 32, at 1286-87.
91. E. Allan Farnsworth, Some Prefatory Remarks: From Rules to Standards, 67 CORNELL L.
REV. 634 (1982); Feinman, Theory, supra note 32, at 1287; Knapp, Offer, supra note 2, at 318;
Speidel, supra note 2, at 260.
92. See FEINMAN, UN-MAKING, supra note 1, at 91-94 (detailing development of the use of
reliance as a basis for enforcement of promise); Feinman, Theory, supra note 32, at 1287-88
(discussing neoclassical contract attempting to balance formal contract structure with communal
standards of responsibility such as reliance). See generally Knapp, Reliance, supra note I
(surveying the history of promissory estoppel); Kevin M. Teeven, A History of Promissory
Estoppel: Growth in the Face of Doctrinal Resistance, 72 TENN. L. REV. 1111 (2005) [hereinafter
Teeven, History] (commenting on the legal history of the development of the doctrine of
justifiable reliance).
93. Eisenberg, Bargain, supra note 60, at 750 ("[M]any contracts are made in markets that are
highly imperfect.").
94. Morant, MLK, supra note 22, at 96 ("Anomalies of the marketplace included opportunism,
the lack of perfect information, and bargaining inequity.") (internal citations omitted); cf. Duncan
Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalistic Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 583
(1982) (recognizing the development of the decision maker to undertake a careful analysis in
terms of the distributive objective and its consistency with freedom of contract); Mensch, History,
supra note 29, at 47 (discussing view that courts should assign right where they are most
valuable, mimicking the real word imperfect market).
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which the parties form the contract 95 now matters in two different but
important ways, 96 namely, in providing interpretation for the agreed-to
contract terms 97 and in supplying additional terms. 9
8
Modem contract law also attempts to effectuate the norms of faimess
and cooperation.99 Significantly, these modem norms are designed to
supplement, not supplant, the classical values of personal autonomy and
liberty.' 00 Modem contract law emphasizes faimess and cooperation in
an effort to mitigate the harshest or most extreme aspects of market
exchanges produced under the classical system. 10 1 Specifically, the
concem seems to center around coercion in the formation of
contracts. 10 2  These modem values are embodied in the expanded
policing doctrines recognized by modem contract law 10 3 and the
emergence of reliance and restitution as altematives to the traditional
contract. 104
The expanded policing doctrines include economic duress,
misrepresentation, and unconscionability. 10 5  All of these doctrines
focus on the faimess of the bargaining process and sometimes the
resulting exchange, as well as on the interdependence of the parties in
95. Professor Eisenberg would characterize "the context within which a contract is formed" to
mean that modem contract law has become more individualized and subjective vis-t-vis the
classical approach, which was strictly standardized and objective. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Dynamic,
supra note 2, at 1756 (discussing the modem approach to consideration); id. at 1756-60
(discussing the modem approach to interpretation).
96. Knapp, Offer, supra note 2, at 317.
97. Eisenberg, Dynamic, supra note 2, at 1756-60.
98. Feinman, Theory, supra note 32, at 1287; Speidel, supra note 2, at 260-61.
99. Eisenberg, Responsive, supra note 3, at 1111-12; Feinman, Theory, supra note 32, at
1288; Knapp, Offer, supra note 2, at 318; Morant, Race, supra note 2, at 902-03.
100. Gabel & Feinman, supra note 36, at 497 ("The principle of personal autonomy
underlying freedom of contract has been supplemented by modem principles of cooperation and
fairness .... "); Morant, MLK, supra note 22, at 97 ("While clinging to the notion of contractual
freedom and bargaining autonomy, neoclassicists appreciated some of the realities of bargaining
differences.") (internal citations omitted).
101. Feinman, Theory, supra note 32, at 1309-10; Gabel & Feinman, supra note 36, at 497.
102. FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 1.7; Gabel & Feinman, supra note 36, at 497-98; Morant,
MLK, supra note 22, at 97-98. This conclusion is also based on modem contract law's responses
to the classical system, namely, the expanded policing doctrines. See supra text accompanying
notes 6-22.
103. Knapp, Offer, supra note 2, at 318. The traditional contract policing doctrines include
minority, mental incapacity, duress, undue influence, and fraud. Modem contract law continues
to recognize them as well. See supra note 7; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§§14 (minority), 15 (mental illness or defect), 175 (duress), 177 (undue influence) (1981).
104. Feinman, Theory, supra note 32, at 1288; Robert Hillman, The Crisis in Modem
Contract Theory, 67 TEX. L. REV. 103, 103-04 (1988); Knapp, Offer, supra note 2, at 318;
Morant, MLK, supra note 22, at 97; Speidel, supra note 2, at 260-61.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 41
contract formation. 10 6 If argued successfully, these doctrines result in
the rescission or unenforceability of coerced bargains. 107
Reliance and restitution, as alternative bases of contractual
obligation, 10 8 afford relief where a "traditional contract"10 9 is not
found. 110 Here, the parties either started to perform or prepared to
perform what they thought was a traditional contract and, in the process,
one party changed position to his detriment or conferred an
uncompensated benefit on the other party. Modern contract law deems
it unfair under these circumstances to deny relief to the injured party1l
and, therefore, provides an alternative remedy.
Clearly, there are differences, even significant differences, between
the classical and modern contract law systems. But the question is, do
the differences matter? For the reasons developed in the next Part, I
think the answer is no.
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS §§ 208 cmt. c-d (unconscionability), 176 cmt. d-f
(improper threat) (1981); Eisenberg, Bargain, supra note 60, at 748-85; Eisenberg,
Consideration, supra note 4, at 640-41 (discussing unconscionability).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 6-22.
108. See MURRAY, CASES & MATERIALS, supra note 3, at 26 (discussing modem contract
law's recognition of promises supported by consideration and reliance); Charles J. Goetz &
Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J.
1261, 1262 (1980) (stating that the modem system permits enforcement of a promise using the
principles of bargain, detrimental reliance, and unjust enrichment); Joseph M. Perillo, Restitution
in a Contractual Context, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1208, 1212-15 (1973) (stating that restitution is a
substantive basis of contractual liability); Metzger & Phillips, supra note 30, at 508-09 (noting
that promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment (i.e., restitution) became separate causes of action
under the Restatement of Contracts); Judy B. Sloan, Quantum Meruit: Residual Equity in Law, 42
DEPAUL L. REV. 399, 426 (1992) (observing that quantum meruit [restitution] can be an
"alternative contract remedy upon a breach or repudiation of an express contract").
109. A traditional contract is one that satisfies the classical formation elements of mutual
assent and consideration. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (1981) ("[T]he
formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the
exchange and a consideration.").
110. See, e.g. Eric G. Anderson, The Restoration Interest and Damages for Breach of
Contract, 53 MD. L. REV. 1, 12 (1994) (stating that restitutionary awards "may provide relief
when a contract is or has become unenforceable because it runs afoul of legal restrictions such as
the Statute of Frauds"); Teeven, History, supra note 92, at 1140 (stating that strict adherence to
the classical system left parties that detrimentally relied on a promise without remedy).
11. Hillman, supra note 104, at 104 ("Although based in part on the principle of freedom of
contract, modem contract law is also tempered both within and without its formal structure by
principles, such as reliance and unjust enrichment, that focus on fairness and the interdependence
of parties rather than on parties' actual agreements.") (internal citations omitted); Lon L. Fuller
and William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages 1, 46 YALE L. J. 52, 53-
57 (1936); Teeven, History, supra note 92, at 1140 ("Strict adherence to traditional doctrine left
reliance hardship unremedied. In the interest of fairness, appellate courts began granting
commercial reliance relief [in some instances].").
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III. CONTESTING WISDOM
The discussion in Part II represents the conventional version of the
evolutionary story of contract law. 112  In this rendition, it is the
differences between the two contract law systems that make it possible,
at least theoretically, for the modem system to undo some of the
potential harshness produced by classical contract. 113 The differences,
in other words, are the most significant part of the story.
But this is where the conventional wisdom is wrong. The ways in
which the two systems remain the same are actually more important
than their differences. In fact, it is the sameness between the systems
that dooms modem contract law to fail1 14 in its efforts to address the
classical system's coercion problem. 115
A. Rearticulating the Evolutionary Story-The Sameness is More
Important
Modem contract law is not a complete rejection of the principles
underlying the classical legal system-it actually retains key elements
of it.116 Thus, modem contract law represents only a partial, not a total,
shift away from classical legal thought. 117
Under modem contract law, the individual remains the basic unit of
social interaction. 118 The individual still acts out of self-interest and her
primary goal remains achieving her own ends in the market. 119 It is
therefore important to note that, notwithstanding its recognition that the
market is not perfect, 120 the modem system, like the classical system
112. But see supra note 28.
113. See supra notes 2-5.
114. See, e.g., Mensch, History, supra note 29, at 41 ("[T]he vocabulary of modem treatises
[like Corbin on contracts] is still the vocabulary of classical doctrine-questions of justice
emerge within discussions of offer and acceptance .... The message is that we can advance
beyond the silly stage of formalism while still retaining the basic structure and premises of
classical thought." However, "Corbin ... leave[s] unresolved the old conflict between formal
rules and general standards of substantive justice .... ") (emphasis in original) (internal citations
omitted).
115. See supra text accompanying notes 6-22.
116. Feinman, Critical, supra note 2, at 833; Mensch, History, supra note 29, at 41-42.
117. Feinman, Critical, supra note 2, at 833. Feinman argues that modem contract law can be
referred to as "neoclassical" contract law. He writes that,"[t]he word "neoclassical" suggests the
partial nature of the accommodation, indicating that neoclassical contract has not so far departed
from classical law that a wholly new name is appropriate." Feinman, Theory, supra note 32, at
1285. I agree with Feinman on this point; but, because I have made consistent reference to the
"modem" system in this Article, I will continue to use that nomenclature to avoid confusion.
118. Feinman, Theory, supra note 32, at 1310.
119. Feinman, Context, supra note 80, at 739, 743.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 93-94.
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before it, continues to rely on the idea of a self-regulated market as the
primary means of mediating the competing and conflicting desires of
these self-interested individuals. 12 1 Furthermore, individual liability is
still premised on voluntary agreement. 122  Modem contract law thus
retains two pivotal assumptions of classical legal thought: (1) private
agreement represents a distinct area of social interaction and legal
processes; and (2) the fundamental belief that contract law can
successfully regulate it. 123 In so doing, modem contract law essentially
retains the public/private distinction. 124  And, as with classical legal
thought, the heart of the private law system remains freedom of
contract. 125
In effect, therefore, the paradigm under modem law remains the
private law transaction. 126 As a result, modem law retains most of the
classical legal system's premises, but with a few modifications. 127
Those assumptions are laid out in Table 1:
121. According to Jay Feinman, there is an "ideology of the market" still regnant in legal
education, politics, government, and social thought generally. He writes:
This ideology presents the market as the primary form of social organization, as an
empirical fact and a desirable state of affairs. The market effectively enables
individuals to achieve their life projects while maximizing social welfare as a whole. It
arises and proceeds through a spontaneous order, obviating centralized planning or
significant government intervention. All of these virtues require no more than modest
correction at the margins, and the job of the law is to maintain the conditions of the
market, notably through establishing the ground rules of property and contract,
providing legal institutions and mechanisms to facilitate market transactions, and
maintaining social order.
Jay M. Feinman, Book Review, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 287, 293 (2005).
122. Feinman, Theory, supra note 32, at 1287.
123. Id. at 1292, 1309; Dalton, supra note 31, at 1014.
124. Mensch, History, supra note 29, at 39 ("[M]odern American legal thought continues to
be premised on the distinction between private law and public law. Private law is still assumed to
be about private actors with private rights, making private choices .... ") (emphasis in original).
125. Feinman, Theory, supra note 32; Morant, Race, supra note 2, at 902.
126. Feinman, Fall, supra note 30, at 1538; Mensch, History, supra note 29, at 39, 41.
127. See supra Part ILB (discussing the differences between modem and classical contract
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Table 1: The Basic Assumptions of the Classical & Modem Systems 
12 8
Classical System Modern System
Contract law is private, meaning it is a Contract law is private, meaning it is a
private transaction between two private private transaction between two private
parties. parties.
Parties bargain at arm's length, i.e., they Parties bargain at arm's length, i.e., they
are most likely strangers to one another, are most likely strangers to one another.
Parties have equal, or roughly equal,
bargaining power.
Parties have equal access to information.
Individuals act as rational actors in the Individuals act as rational actors in the
marketplace. marketplace.
Contracts are the product of voluntary and Contracts are the product of voluntary and
informed choice, informed choice.
Contract law is the law of the market. Contract law is the law of the market.
Implicit, but central to this understanding, Central to this understanding, are the
are the notions that markets are neutral notions that markets are still neutral and
and impartial, and also perfect, self- impartial, mainly self-regulating and
regulating, and largely outside of state largely outside of state control, but do
control. contain imperfections primarily in the
form of information asymmetries and
bargaining inequalities. Any
imperfections, however, can be remedied
with minimal interference from the state,
thereby maintaining the integrity of the
market.
The role of the state is neutral and The role of the state is neutral and
minimal, minimal.
To summarize the table, there are only three differences in the basic
assumptions of the classical system vis-A-vis the modem system.
128. For the classical assumptions, see supra text accompanying notes 72-79; for the modem
assumptions, see supra text accompanying notes 72-73, 76-79, 93-94.
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 41
Specifically, the modem system no longer assumes that the parties have
equal, or roughly equal, bargaining power or equal access to
information. Instead the modem system recognizes these as types of
market failures and, consequently, no longer assumes that markets are
perfect. But all the other classical assumptions remain unchanged. 129
The next section explores the specific implications of the sameness
between the modem and classical contract law systems.
B. Power is in the Core, and the Core of Contract is Formation
In brief, the parts of the classical legal system retained by modem
contract law leave the core of classical contract, which is contract
formation, completely intact. 130 Formation is the core, because this is
where power is centered. 131 Modem contract law kept and continues to
keep formation and, therefore, the core of contract, intact. 132  It is,
however, easier to form a contract under modern contract law than it
was under the classical regime. 133 But, by making it easier to form a
contract, the modem system actually expands one contracting party's
capacity for coercion because formation is where the party with the
capacity to coerce imposes the contract terms that it wants. 134  By
leaving formation essentially unaltered, modem contract law not only
expands one party's capacity to coerce her contracting partner, but also
largely immunizes this coercion from effective challenge by the contract
129. One could reasonably question whether modem contract law retained the classical
assumption that parties bargain at arm's length and are most likely strangers to one another, given
Professor Ian Macneil's relational contract theory. In brief, Professor Macneil's theory assumes
that parties are often likely to have dealt with each other before and/or are likely to do so again,
either in long-term evolving contractual relationships or in repeat transactions of essentially
similar nature. Consequently, the parties are not necessarily strangers to one another. See
generally Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 Nw. U. L.
REV. 877 (2000). I agree that Professor Macneil's relational contract theory, which he has
advanced since the mid- 1960s, is a direct challenge to the classical and modern assumption noted
above. My argument, and hence my response to the query, however, is that Professor Macneil's
theory is a critique of modem contract law's continued adherence to the classical assumption that
contracts are private and discrete exchanges between strangers. If modem contract law did not
adhere to the classical assumption, that is, if modem contract law adopted Professor Macneil's
theory, it would be unnecessary to mount the critique, or continue it. Cf Feinman, Context,
supra note 80, at 743 ("If we think of relational contract as a reaction to [modem] contract, the
emphasis on cooperation is a corrective to [modem] law's retention of the core classical position
of self-interest.").
130. See infra Part III.B.2.
131. See infra Part III.B.4.
132. See infra Part I11.B.2.
133. See infra Part 111.B.3.
134. See infra Part III.B.5.
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policing doctrines. 135 This is because a presumption of contract validity
is created upon formation of the contract, which is extremely difficult to
rebut in practice. Thus, because it leaves the core of contract intact,
modern contract law will be unable to mitigate the coercion problem.' 36
1. The Core of Classical Contract Law is Formation-Literally,
Mutual Assent and Consideration 137
Formation is the core of classical contract for several reasons. The
first reason is the obvious one: formation is where contract law starts.
In other words, the rest of contract law flows from formation. 138 With
the exception of reliance and restitution, 139 the rest of contract law is
implicated only if a "traditional contract," that is, one formed via mutual
assent and consideration, exists. 140
Second, formation is where both the classical and now modem
systems' assumptions 14 1 originate and are applied. Formation is the
legal space in which two private actors armed with enough information
voluntarily come together in their own self-interest and make a rational
135. See infra Part III.B.5.
136. See infra Part I.B.5.
137. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 19(b)-(c) (1932); Morant, Race, supra note
2, at 900-01 ("Classical or traditional theory of contract law has as its infrastructure the strict
adherence to procedural aspects of bargain formation; ... parties who conformed to the process..
•, including the requisite elements of mutual assent and consideration, gain security in the axiom
that their resultant bargain would be enforced.") (footnote omitted); id. at 904-05 (Classical
theorists placed "significant emphasis upon the manifestation of assent and the presence of
consideration. If these latter two elements are present, strict enforcement of the resultant
agreement must ensue.") (footnote omitted). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 17(1) (1981) ("[T]he formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation
of mutual assent to the exchange and a consideration."); Morant, MLK, supra note 22, at 93 ("A
basic tenet of traditional, classic contract theory requires that parties steadfastly obey the rules of
bargain formation in order to have binding agreements . . . Those whose agreements manifest
mutual assent and contain consideration may expect the enforcement of their resultant
agreements, barring some impediment.") (footnotes omitted).
138. See infra Part I1I.B.2 (documenting that all the other contract doctrines are implicated
only if a contract is formed first).
139. As it is, restitution is not a contract at all. There is an entirely separate body of law
governing restitution. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION (1937). As for reliance, there is
only one reliance-based claim recognized in contract law and that is promissory estoppel. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). While contract law does include
provisions for restitution and reliance damages, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§
349 (reliance damages), 373 (restitution damages in favor of non-breaching party) (1981), the
bulk of contract law-formation, interpretation, performance, and breach-all deal with a
traditional contract. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981).
140. See infra Part HI.B.2 (documenting that all the other contract doctrines are implicated
only if a contract is formed first).
141. See supra Table I (listing the classical and modern contract law assumptions).
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choice about whether to enter into a contract. 142 It follows, then, that
formation is where the classical norms of individual autonomy and
liberty are given full effect.
Finally, for reasons that I develop more fully below, formation is the
core of classical contract because this is where power is centered. 1
43
2. Modem Contract Law Continues to Keep the Core-Formation-
Intact
Modem contract law made no changes to the elements required to
form a contract. Mutual assent and consideration are still all that are
needed to form a valid, traditional contract. 144 Indeed, modem contract
law leaves the core alone. All of the new or expanded doctrines it
recognizes, and its interpretation of existing doctrines, assumes a
contract was formed in the first instance. For example, the parol
evidence rule applies by definition only to "a writing intended by the
parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such
terms as are included therein[.]"' 145 In other words, a contract has to
exist before the parol evidence rule comes into play. The same is true
of the modem approach to contract interpretation, 146 specifically, in
deciding whose meaning of disputed contract language prevails 47 and
in supplying gap-fillers. 148
142. See supra Table 1.
143. See infra Part III.B.4.
144. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFCONTRACTS § 17(1) (1981).
145. U.C.C. § 2-202 (2003); accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 210, 213(a)
(1981).
146. Interpretation can involve two different questions. While there is overlap between the
two questions, see, e.g., LON L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW
393-95 (8th ed. 2006), I think they determine fundamentally different things. But see Eisenberg,
Dynamic, supra note 2, at 1756-60 (combining the contract formation and the contract
interpretation questions into a discussion of "contract interpretation" generally). The first
question is whether a contract was formed at all. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§
20, 200 cmts. a & b (1981). In this scenario, however, the applicable rules governing that
analysis are found in Chapter 3 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Formation of
Contracts-Mutual Assent, and primarily in Restatement Sections 17-20. In contrast, the second
interpretive question asks whose meaning of disputed contract language prevails.
147. This interpretation question is governed by Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 201.
Here, the parties are now disputing what they meant when they manifested their assent to the
contract. The court is called upon to decide which party's meaning prevails through the process
of interpretation which, under the modem approach, draws no distinction between interpretation
and construction. FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 7.7, at 440. Consequently, the process of
interpretation now determines the meaning to be attributed to disputed contract language and the
legal effect of that language. It is true that the process of interpretation may result in a failure of
mutual assent. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201(3) (1981). But this does not
negate the argument that the parties were operating under the assumption that a valid contract
existed. Absent such a common understanding between the parties, there would be no one
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Similarly, if established on the facts, all the contract policing
doctrines, like fraud, undue influence, duress, unconscionability, and
misrepresentation, either result in a voidable contract or make a contract
unenforceable in whole or in part.14 9 The same can be said of the risk
allocation defenses, like mistake (bilateral or unilateral),
impracticability of performance, and frustration of purpose. By
definition, they only apply to contracts already in existence.15 ° Clearly,
disputing the meaning of contract language to determine his/her performance obligations. In
other words, if the parties did not think they were bound by a contract and, hence, subject to
liability for failing to perform, common sense says that no one would be asking a court to
determine whose meaning prevailed, i.e., the interpretive question posed by § 201. The existence
of a valid contract must therefore be presumed. If not, if they were disputing the very existence
of a valid contract, they would (or should) have argued lack of mutual assent under Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 201. Compare Professor Chamy's view:
[T]he hypothetical bargain framework is invoked [by courts] . . . to interpret
'ambiguous' language; that is, to apply the language of a contract to a particular
contingency which subsequently arises, the court [ ] construe[s] the language ... so as
to give effect to what would have been the intention and agreement of the parties had
their attention been drawn to events as they actually were to occur.
David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89
MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1816 (1991) (footnote omitted).
148. The same is true for contract gap-fillers, also known as default rules and/or implied
terms. They, too, presuppose that a contract is already formed. See Randy E. Barnett, The Sound
of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REv. 821, 822-24 (1992)
(discussing the evolution of the terminology and what he perceives as its significance). There
seems to be general agreement that all contracts are incomplete, to one degree or another. Id. at
821. Default rules therefore supply the terms that are implied by the courts, or a statute, like the
Uniform Commercial Code, to fill in the gaps of incomplete contracts. Id. at 822, 825-26; Ian
Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 YALE L. J. 87, 87-88 (1989). Consequently, if default rules provide the terms that fill
in the gaps of an incomplete contract, it seems quite clear that a contract has to exist. Absent the
existence of a contract, in other words, there would be no need to discuss, let alone impose, a
default rule, or gap-filler. There would simply be no one disputing his/her performance
obligation under a contract to which a contract term would need to be implied. The existence of a
valid contract must therefore be presumed. Also, as Professor Chamy writes:
[C]ourts use the [hypothetical bargain] rule as one of 'construction': to supply 'implied
duties' in the face of a contingency that no language in the contract addresses ....
[W]hen supplying terms of an effective but incomplete contract a court properly picks
those for which the parties probably would have bargained, had they anticipated the
problem.
See, e.g., Chamy, supra note 147, at 1816 (footnotes omitted).
149. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 164, 175, 177, 208 (1981). See supra
notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
150. For example, the Restatement rule for mutual mistake explicitly states that, "[w]here a
mistake of both parties [exists] at the time a contract was made as to a basic assumption on which
the contract was made . . . , the contract is voidable ....... RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 152 (1981) (emphasis added). This language clearly contemplates that a contract
was formed by the parties, albeit under a legal mistake. The rule for unilateral mistake contains
the same language. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (1981). The rules for
impracticability of performance and frustration of purpose are even more explicit. The
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only a contract that exists can later be discharged or made voidable or
unenforceable. There would simply be no reason to invoke a contract
policing doctrine or risk allocation defense if a contract did not exist in
the first instance.
3. Modem Contract Law Makes It Easier to Form a Contract
One of the hallmarks of classical contract law was its adherence to
rigid and technical rules, 151 particularly in the context of contract
formation. 152  Parties had to satisfy very specific requirements
regarding contract formation and the requirements were either met or
they were not; there was no middle ground. 153 Classical contract law
thus envisioned the formation process looking something like this:
First, parties engage in a period of preliminary negotiation,
exchanging communications of a more or less detailed nature about
the type of exchange of performances to which each would be willing
to agree. Next, one party (the "offeror") makes an "offer"-a direct,
complete proposal that a contract be entered into, providing for an
exchange of defined performances. This has the effect of creating in
the party to which that offer is addressed a "power of acceptance." If
that other party (the "offeree") manifests her "acceptance" of the offer
in a legally effective way, then at that moment a contract comes into
being. If the initial offer is not acceptable, however, the offeree may
respond by making a "counter-offer" of her own, which may in turn be
accepted by the original offeror (thus giving rise to a contract different
from the one she originally proposed). Of course, a contract may
never come into being at all; the offeree may simply reject the offer
without making one of her own in return. Or, the offeree may delay
too long in accepting, so that the power of acceptance created by the
offer has been terminated either by a time limit (explicit or implicit)
Restatement rule for impracticability, for example, states in pertinent part that, "[w]here, after a
contract is made, a party's performance is made impracticable . . . his duty to render that
performance is discharged .... " Id. § 261 (emphasis added). The rule for frustration of purposes
contains identical language. See id. § 265.
151. See supra Part I.A.
152. Eisenberg, Offers, supra note 2, at 271; Knapp, Offer, supra note 2, at 322; Metzger &
Phillips, supra note 30, at 481; Morant, Race, supra note 2, at 900 ("Classical or traditional
theory of contract law has as its infrastructure the strict adherence to procedural aspects of
bargain formation[.]").
153. Mensch, Ideology, supra note 34, at 755-56 ("According to [the classical model of
contract formation], only a voluntary exchange of promises (the traditional offer and acceptance)
gave rise to contractual obligations. At the moment of exchange (and not a second sooner), a
right of expectation sprang into being."); FEINMAN, UN-MAKING, supra note 1, at 112-13;
Eisenberg, Offers, supra note 2, at 271.
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contained in the offer itself or by the offeror's withdrawal
("revocation") of his offer. 154
The classical system's approach to contract formation can be
contrasted with the modem system's approach, which has been adopted
by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts.' 55 Contract formation under both, and therefore
under modem contract law, is consciously made much easier. 156  For
example, both Article 2 and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
recognize that a contract can be formed by words or conduct 157 and
even if the exact moment of mutual assent cannot be identified1 58 or is
delayed,159 or the contract lacks material terms. 160 Modem contract law
154. KNAPP, CASEBOOK, supra note 4, at 34; see also, Mensch, Ideology, supra note 34, at
755.
155. Knapp, Offer, supra note 2, at 317.
156. FEINMAN, UNMAKING, supra note 1, at 15; Charles L. Knapp, The Promise of the
Future-And Vice Versa: Some Reflections on the Metamorphosis of Contract Law, 82 MICH. L.
REV. 932, 937 (1984) [hereinafter Knapp, Future]; Mooney, supra note 1, at 1136-38.
157. See U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (2003) ("A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner
sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of
such a contract."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19(1) (1981) ("The manifestation
of assent may be made wholly or partly by written or spoken words or by other acts or by a
failure to act.").
158. See U.C.C. § 2-204(2) (2003) ("An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale
may be found even though the moment of its making is undetermined."); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 22(2) (1981) ("A manifestation of mutual assent may be made even
though neither offer nor acceptance can be identified and even though the moment of formation
cannot be determined.").
159. As the U.C.C. states:
This section applies when the price term is left open on the making of an agreement
which is nevertheless intended by the parties to be a binding agreement. This Article
rejects in these instances the formula that "an agreement to agree is unenforceable" if
the case falls within subsection (1) of this section, and rejects also defeating such
agreements on the ground of "indefiniteness". Instead this Article recognizes the
dominant intention of the parties to have the deal continue to be binding upon both.
U.C.C. § 2-305 cmt. 1 (2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 27 (1981)
("Manifestations of assent that are in themselves sufficient to conclude a contract will not be
prevented from so operating by the fact that the parties also manifest an intention to prepare and
adopt a written memorial thereof .... ).
160. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (2003) ("The parties if they so intend can conclude a
contract for sale even though the price is not settled."). Additionally, the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts states:
Parties who plan to make a final written instrument as the expression of their contract
necessarily discuss the proposed terms of the contract before they enter into it and
often, before the final writing is made, agree upon all the terms which they plan to
incorporate therein. This they may do orally or by exchange of several writings. It is
possible thus to make a contract the terms of which include an obligation to execute
subsequently a final writing which shall contain certain provisions.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 27 cmt. a (1981).
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thus recognizes that contracts can be formed in stages, rather than only
upon the happening of the clearly identified events required by classical
contract. 161
4. Power is in the Core (Formation)
Of the two formation elements, 162 mutual assent is key. This is
because power does not emanate from consideration but rather is
centered in mutual assent. 163
Consideration is defined as "[t]he inducement to a contract; the
cause, motive, price, or impelling influence which induces a contracting
party to enter into a contract." 164  Much has been written about the
element of consideration. 165 I do not argue that consideration is
unimportant to contract formation; it remains one of the two elements
necessary to form a contract. 166  But modem contract law only
recognizes one test for consideration, the bargain-theory. 167 So, if
161. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 27 cmt. a (1981); FARNSWORTH, supra
note 6, § 3.5; Eisenberg, Dynamic, supra note 2, at 1796; Knapp, Offer, supra note 2, at 322
("Whether one speaks of a 'contract to bargain,' an 'agreement to negotiate,' or a 'binding
preliminary commitment,' the lesson is essentially the same: sometimes contracts are formed not
by flipping a switch, but by gradually turning up a dimmer.") (footnotes omitted); see also U.C.C.
§ 2-305 cmt. 1 (2003).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 137, 144.
163. Professor Melvin Eisenberg writes:
The school of classical contract law placed the process of offer and acceptance on
center stage. Under the teachings of that school, contract was virtually identical to
bargain, and bargains were conceived to be formed by offer and acceptance .... At
the instant that a bargain contract is formed by offer and acceptance, a promisor
becomes potentially liable for expectation damages even if he changes his mind a
nanosecond later. Because the formation of contract has such potent consequences,
much can ride on the rules that govern the offer-and-acceptance process.
Eisenberg, Offers, supra note 2, at 271 (footnote omitted); cf Knapp, Future, supra note 156, at
947 (questioning the importance of consideration). But see James Gordley, Equality in Exchange,
69 CAL. L. REV. 1587 (1981) (reconsidering the principle of equality in exchange and arguing
that it remains a governing principle in determining the outcome of contract disputes, particularly
those involving one-sided bargains).
164. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 161 (5th ed. 1979).
165. See Eisenberg, Bargain, supra note 60, at 745; Eisenberg, Consideration, supra note 4, at
640; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Contracts and Property Law: The Emergence of Dynamic Contract
Law, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 12-15 (2001); Eisenberg, Dynamic, supra note 2, at 1754-
56; see also Craig Leonard Jackson, Traditional Contract Theory: Old and New Attacks and Old
and New Defenses, 33 NEW ENG. L. REV. 365 (1999); Peter Linzer, Teaching Important
Contracts Concepts: Consider Consideration, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1317 (2000); Mark B.
Wessman, Retraining the Gatekeeper: Further Reflections on the Doctrine of Consideration, 29
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 713, 845 (1996); Mark B. Wessman, Should We Fire the Gatekeeper? An
Examination of the Doctrine of Consideration, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 45 (1993).
166. Seesupra notes 137, 144.
167. See Eisenberg, Dynamic, supra note 2, at 1754 ("A basic axiom of the classical school,
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something is bargained for, consideration is present. To be "bargained
for" simply means that "the parties' manifestations must have reference
to each other, i.e., that they be reciprocal."' 168 Using the language of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, something is bargained for "if it is
sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by a
promisee in exchange for that promise."'169
Let us now revisit the Party A-Party B example 70 where Party B has
something that Party A wants or needs. Assume, for instance, that Party
B has a house that he wants to sell. Party A has money that she is
willing to part with to get Party B's house, and Party B is willing to part
with his house to get Party A's money. As you can see in this
transaction, Party A and Party B's manifestations refer to each other-
the house for the money. Party A is seeking Party B's house in
exchange for her money, and vice-versa. Consideration, therefore, is
present. Indeed, one can usually assume that consideration is present in
transactions taking place in the market. 171  In a business context,
consideration is often irrelevant because the law will enforce a bargain
even in its absence. 172
In the Party A-Party B hypothetical, even though consideration is
clearly present in the sale of the house, the specific terms of the sale
must still be agreed to by the parties via mutual assent. 173 For example,
Party A and Party B have to agree to, among other things, the sale price
however, was that to constitute consideration a promise or performance must be bargained-for-
the so-called bargain theory of consideration."); Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the "New
Consensus" on Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical and Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
580, 585 (1998) ("By the late nineteenth century, if not earlier, the most important basis for
enforcing promises was the bargain theory of consideration. To be enforceable under the bargain
theory, a promise had to be supported by consideration, meaning that the promisor would receive
something in exchange for the promise.") (footnote omitted). FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 2.2,
at 47; Kevin M. Teeven, Origins of Promissory Estoppel: Justifiable Reliance and Commercial
Uncertainty Before Williston's Restatement, 34 U. MEM. L. REV. 499, 512, 524 (2004).
168. FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 3.1, at 108.
169. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(2) (1981).
170. See supra text accompanying note 15.
171. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 2.2, at 48; cf Knapp, Reliance, supra note 1, at 1195
("[Bly stressing the law's willingness to enforce bargains per se, whatever their terms, Holmesian
contract doctrine moved away from earlier equitable notions of 'just price' or 'unconscionability'
toward the proposition that virtually any exchange-based bargain, no matter how lop-sided, could
and probably would be upheld as consideration-supported.").
172. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-205 (2003) (creating an option contract without requiring
consideration); U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (2003) (making a modification under Article 2 binding without
consideration); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 (a), (c) (1981) (containing
exceptions to the pre-existing duty rule that validate modifications obtained without
consideration).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 137, 144.
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of the house, any conditions that would cause the sale to be canceled,
and the closing date. And the terms that the parties agree on via mutual
assent will ultimately determine whether the bargain is good or bad for
one of the parties.174 Consequently, power in the core of contract is not
located in the doctrine of consideration; rather, it is centered in mutual
assent. 175
Mutual assent is key because it is during the assent process that most
material terms are decided 176 and the contract boilerplate 177 is added.
This is also where the critical decision is made whether to enter into the
contract or not. If the parties decide to enter the contract, 178 then the
state effectively steps in and binds them to their contract. 179
Being "bound to the contract" has two important, yet distinct
meanings. First, at the point of formation the state creates a
presumption that the contract and all of its terms are valid. 180  Second,
the state will enforce the rights contained in that contract. 18 1
The presumption of contract validity exists by negative implication,
because upon formation, the state imposes the burden of overcoming the
presumption and proving that the contract or term is invalid on the party
challenging the contract or term. 182 Mutual assent provides an excellent
illustration of the mechanics of this claim.
174. See supra note 154.
175. Cf. Morant, Race, supra note 2, at 904 ("To a significant degree, a crucial element in the
probability of enforcement of these bargains [i.e., bargains concluded as a result of compliance
with the classical contract formation rules] is the reality and genuineness of the parties' assent.")
(footnote omitted).
176. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 27 (1981).
177. "Boilerplate" is "[l]anguage which is used commonly in documents having a definite
meaning in the same context without variation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 92 (5th ed. 1979).
Common contract boilerplate includes arbitration provisions, choice of law, and choice of forum
clauses. See generally Knapp, Opting, supra note 3, at 95; Knapp, Private, supra note 1, at 775-
76; William J. Woodward, Jr., Finding the Contract in Contracts for Law, Forum and
Arbitration, 2 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1 (2006).
178. Since consideration is usually present in market transactions, see supra text
accompanying note 171, contract formation would be complete when the parties expressed their
assent to the contract.
179. See infra text accompanying notes 222-23.
180. See infra text accompanying notes 182-221.
181. See infra text accompanying notes 222-23.
182. See Du Frene v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 41 Cal. Rptr. 834, 837 (Ct. App. 1965) (holding that
a party must submit evidence to prove the party's case if seeking the affirmative on an issue or
risk defeat); Patriotti v. Gen. Elec. Co., 587 A.2d 231, 232 (Me. 1991) (holding that the party
claiming the affirmative defense has the burden of proof); Robert Belton, Burdens of Pleading
and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REV.
1205, 1282 (1981) (explaining that generally it is the plaintiff in a civil action who must prove his
claim); Ho Cheol Kim, Burden of Proof and the Whole Prima Facie Case: The Evolving History
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There are several formulations of mutual assent currently espoused
by academics and practitioners. 183 All of these formulations attempt to
grapple with the practice of modem day contracting, such as the
ubiquitous use of standard forms 184 and internet contracting in the form
of browse wrap, 185 shrink wrap186 and click wrap agreements, 187 and
rolling contracts,188 to name a few. While these formulations come
from different ideological perspectives, they are all tilted in favor of
finding that mutual assent exists. In other words, it is easy to establish
mutual assent under modem contract law. 189  This is especially true
and Its Application in the WTO Jurisprudence, 6 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 245, 251 (2007)
(stating that the complaining party bears the burden of proof in a civil case).
183. I am not taking a position on whether any of these formulations are right or wrong. I am
simply looking for current tests or standards used to determine whether mutual assent is
established on a given set of facts.
184. See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts and Worker Mobility: The Dilution of
Employee Bargaining Power Via Standard Form Noncompetes, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 963, 977
n.51 (2006) (stating that standardized forms are the dominant form of contracting); Todd D.
Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1177 (1983)
(defining seven characteristics of a model "contract of adhesion").
185. See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 429 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[A] browse
wrap license is part of the web site [e.g., license terms are posted on a site's home page or are
accessible by a prominently displayed hyperlink,] and the user assents to the contract when the
user visits the web site.").
186. See Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981 (E.D. Cal. 2000) ("A
shrinkwrap license appears on the screen when the CD or diskette is inserted and does not let the
consumer proceed without indicating acceptance."); Donnie L. Kidd, Jr. & William H.
Daughtrey, Jr., Adapting Contract Law To Accommodate Electronic Contracts: Overview and
Suggestions, 26 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 215, 243 (2000) ("Commonly used in
software packaging, 'shrink-wrap' contracts provide that an offeree accepts all provisions of the
sales agreement simply by opening the software package.").
187. See Oracle USA v. Graphnet, Inc., No. C06-05351, 2007 WL 485959, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
2007) ("The 'click-wrap agreement' requires the potential customer to manifest his or her assent
to the terms of a license by clicking a button on a dialog box or pop-up window before the
customer can download the software being licensed or before the software media will be shipped
to the customer."); Hotels.com, L.P. v. Canales, 195 S.W.3d 147, 154-55 (Tex. App. 2006)
("'Click-wrap' agreements require the user to review or scroll through terms and assent to the
contractual terms by clicking a button that reads 'I Agree' or manifesting some other means of
express assent.").
188. See Stephen E. Friedman, Improving the Rolling Contract, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006)
("Rolling contracts are contracts formed over time, with the seller presenting the terms in batches.
Some terms are provided before or during the purchase or order, while others are provided later.
These transactions typically give the buyer a right to return a purchased item or cancel a
purchased service to avoid the transaction."); Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency
Problem, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 679, 681 (2004) ("These arrangements essentially permit parties to
reach agreement over basic terms, such as price and quantity, but leave until a later time, usually
simultaneous with the delivery or first use of the goods, the presentation of additional terms that
the buyer can accept, often by simply using the good, or reject, by returning it.").
189. One could argue that mutual assent may not be as easy to establish as I claim, because
modem contract law tries to give effect to the parties' intent. The parties' intent, in turn, will be
determined by facts and circumstances, some of which are subjective, that the classical approach
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since an objective approach governs any analysis of mutual assent,
regardless of the formulation. 190  Significantly, because all of the
formulations make it easy to find mutual assent, they all suffer from the
same problem, 19 1 their differing ideologies notwithstanding.
Mainstream modern contract law, as expressed in contract law
hornbooks, 192 focuses on the parties' intent to be bound to determine
whether mutual assent has been manifested. 193  The test is
straightforward; it asks: Did the parties engage in actions (words or
conduct) that manifested their assent? 194 If so, did the parties intend to
to formation simply did not take into account. Professor Melvin Eisenberg argues this approach
in his dynamic theory of contract law. See Eisenberg, Dynamic, supra note 2, at 1749 (proposing
that modem contract law largely "consists of principles that are individual, dynamic, multi-
faceted, and, in appropriate cases, subjective"); see also Nancy S. Kim, Evolving Business and
Social Norms and Interpretation Rules: The Need for a Dynamic Approach to Contract Disputes,
84 NEB. L. REV. 506, 508 (2005) (suggesting that "dynamic contract law strives to establish 'the
best possible rules' rather than hewing to formalistic principles"). I agree with the general claim
that it is possible under modem contract law to find that mutual assent cannot be established. But
I disagree that this is a high burden, for two reasons. First, all the modem formulations are tilted
in favor of finding that mutual assent exists and, in several instances, mutual assent is actually
presumed. See infra text accompanying notes 192-202. Second, I agree that "subjective"
elements come into play in determining whether the parties intended to be bound. For example,
the court will look to see what these parties did by their words and/or conduct to manifest their
assent. But the test for "intent to be bound" is still an objective one-whether a reasonable
person believes that the parties intended to engage in those actions-and strikes me as so minimal
that the more usual result is that such an intent would be found. See infra text accompanying note
190; see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 3.7, at 117 (describing ways to show intention to be
legally bound); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 3 1(c), at 58-59 (3d ed.
1990) [hereinafter MURRAY, CONTRACTS] (describing the process of interpretation of whether a
party intended to be legally bound). Hence, I maintain that mutual assent is easy to establish
under modem contract law.
190. FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 3.6, at 115; MURRAY, CONTRACTS, supra note 189, § 30,
at 55; Robert A. Hillman, Contract Lore, 27 J. CORP. L. 505, 511-12 (2002); Joseph M. Perillo,
The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L.
REV. 427 (2000). To establish mutual assent under an objective approach, the law simply
requires an outward and objective manifestation of it by both parties, i.e., through words and/or
conduct. FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, §§ 3.1, 3.6. For example, where both parties sign the
contract, their signatures would be the outward and objective manifestation of their assent to enter
into the contract.
191. See infra text accompanying notes 202-21.
192. See generally FARNSWORTH, supra note 6 (reviewing principles of modem contract law);
MURRAY, CONTRACTS, supra note 189 (discussing major concepts of modem contract law);
JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI & PERILLO ON CONTRACTS (5th ed. 2003) (analyzing modem
contract law).
193. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 3.6 (noting that real but unexpressed state of the
party's mind is irrelevant); MURRAY, CONTRACTS, supra note 189, § 31 (indicating ways to
express intent to be legally bound); PERILLO, supra note 192, § 2.4 (stating that the parties need
not manifest an intent to be contractually bound).
194. FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 3.6.
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engage in those actions? 195  If they did, the parties' assent to the
agreement will be legally established, even if they did not intend or
even understand the legal consequences of their actions.
196
Conservative theorists, like Professors Randy Barnett, Clayton
Gillette, and Judge Frank Easterbrook posit the following formulations
of mutual assent. For example, in the context of form contracts on the
internet, Professor Randy Barnett suggests that clicking "I agree" on a
website manifests mutual assent. Specifically, he argues that clicking "I
agree" expresses intent to be bound by the terms parties have likely read
and the terms that the parties have not likely read but which are not
unreasonable. 19 7
Professor Clayton Gillette proposes that "terms of [rolling contracts]
should be considered binding as long as the process through which they
emerged was one in which the nonreading, nonparticipating buyer was
virtually represented in a manner that satisfies the same objectives as
personal assent." 198 He then elaborates on a complex agency theory
that would allow us to reach the conclusion that nonreading buyers'
interests have been adequately represented by proxies, like sellers,
courts, and/or regulators, such that all of the terms of rolling contracts
should be considered binding. 19
9
Finally, Judge Easterbrook articulated yet another test in ProCD, Inc.
v. Zeidenberg and Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc. Under Judge
Easterbrook's formulation, a contract between a manufacturer and a
buyer is formed when the buyer has a chance to review any hidden
terms (i.e., hidden because the terms came inside the box with the
goods) and assents to them by continued use of the purchased product.
More progressive formulations of mutual assent include the ones
proposed by Karl Llewellyn and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
Under Karl Llewellyn's 1960 proposal for standard forms, he argued
that parties assenting to "boilerplate," or standard form, contracts
specifically assent to a handful of explicitly negotiated terms and "one
thing more," namely, "a blanket assent (not a specific assent) to any not
unreasonable or indecent terms the seller may have on his form."
200
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts' formulation is found in
§ 211, Standardized Agreements, and is not limited to any particular
195. Id.
196. Id. § 3.7; MURRAY, CONTRACTS, supra note 189, § 31; PERILLO, supra note 192, § 2.4.
197. Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 638 (2002).
198. Gillette, supra note 188, at 684.
199. Id. at685-721.
200. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370 (1960).
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type of contract. Section (1) provides in pertinent part that "Except as
stated in Subsection (3), where a party to an agreement signs or
otherwise manifests assent to a writing .. he adopts the writing as an
integrated agreement with respect to the terms included in the writing."
In other words, where there is a manifestation of assent to the writing, a
valid contract is formed on the terms included therein. The only
limitation is expressed in Subsection (3), which states that a term is not
included in the contract if "the other party has reason to believe that the
party manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that the
writing contained [that] particular term." 20 1
All of these formulations of mutual assent have two things in
common. First, they would all find that mutual assent is present and,
therefore, a contract is formed.2 0 2 Indeed, mutual assent is presumed
under all of these views. All of the formulations, therefore, leave the
core of contract, i.e., formation, intact.
Second, because all of the formulations would establish mutual
assent, they all suffer from what I call the "process problem."
Obviously, none of the formulations discussed foreclose a challenge to
the contract terms and, indeed, several of them contemplate that the
mutual assent so established may produce a bad bargain. 20 3  A
challenge, either by way of claim or defense, to the contract terms
constituting the bad bargain would be subject to a reasonableness
standard.20 4 But how is a party supposed to prove the terms are
201. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211.3 (1981).
202. Recall that consideration is usually present in market transactions. See supra text
accompanying note 17 1. Consequently, both elements of contract formation-mutual assent and
consideration-would be present.
203. For example, the Barnett and Llewellyn tests each contemplate that unreasonable terms
may be present in the contract. See supra text accompanying notes 197, 200.
204. A reasonableness standard would govern such a challenge, because (1) two of the
formulations provide for such a standard explicitly, see, e.g., the Barnett and Llewellyn tests,
supra text accompanying notes 197, 200; (2) another formulation suggests a reasonableness
standard, see, e.g., the Restatement test, supra text accompanying note 201 (explaining that the
contract is formed, but a term is not included if one party has reason to believe that the other
would not agree to it). But what kind of term is this? It seems plausible to think that one party
would have reason to believe that the other would not agree to an "unreasonable" term; and (3)
yet another (Gillette's test) would leave the determination to the courts. See supra text
accompanying notes 198-99. Gillette acknowledges that some contract terms may just not lend
themselves to his theory, like terms that are "sufficiently susceptible to market failures." Gillette,
supra note 188, at 722. In those situations, he states that third-party intervenors, i.e., courts
and/or regulators, "would be superior proxies for nonreading buyers." Id. Any intervention with
respect to terms that cannot be accommodated by Gillette's theory would have to be relegated to
the courts.
Given that "reasonableness" is a standard explicitly and implicitly suggested by the mutual
assent formulations, courts are generally familiar with it, and, more importantly, already employ
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unreasonable? Essentially, the party faced with the bad bargain has to
rely on modern contract law's policing doctrines, like
unconscionability, economic duress, and misrepresentation to prove that
the terms at issue should not be included in the contract. 20 5 Coercion in
the bargaining process, therefore, has to be present; otherwise these
particular policing doctrines are not available.20 6  And this is where
problems arise because the burden of establishing the relevant policing
doctrine is on the complaining party who, in all likelihood, is the
coerced party. 207
it in contract disputes over terms, it seems credible to suggest it for Gillette's theory and as the
applicable standard here as well. See Ault v. Pakulski, 520 A.2d 703, 706 (Me. 1987) ("If a
contract leaves open a key term, the law invokes the standard of reasonableness, and courts will
supply the needed term."); Leach v. Tingle, 586 So. 2d 799, 802 (Miss. 1991) ("In ascertaining
whether a contract is sufficiently definite to be enforceable, we have accepted that the court may
employ a standard of reasonableness."); see also Enzio Cassinis, Employment Law: The Tenth
Circuit's Stance on the Evidentiary Scope of a "De Novo" Review in ERISA Benefits Suits, 80
DENV. U. L. REV. 529, 536 n.72 (2003) ("Courts generally subject the interpretation of the
contract to a 'reasonableness standard."'); Kathryn J. Kennedy, Judicial Standard of Review in
ERISA Benefit Claim Cases, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1083, 1999 (2001) ("Under a contractual standard
of review, the courts generally subject the interpretation of the contract to a reasonableness
standard."); M. Mebane Rash, The North Carolina Supreme Court Engages in Stealthy Judicial
Legislation: Doe v. Holt, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1227, 1247 (1993) ("Courts are familiar with applying
reasonableness standards."); Stephen D. Thill, Assigning Error to Viar v. North Carolina
Department of Transportation and State v. Hart: A Proposal for Revision of the North Carolina
Rules of Appellate Procedure, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1799, 1834 (2007) ("[R]easonableness is a
familiar standard that is already applied in many judicial contexts.").
205. Recall that, if established, each of these policing doctrines would make the bad bargain
procured as a result of coercion avoidable or otherwise unenforceable in whole or in part. See
supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 6-22.
207. A bad bargain in the form of one or more bad terms has to be a given, otherwise no one
would challenge those contract term(s) using modem contract's expanded contract policing
doctrines. Granted, any contract could end up being a bad bargain for one or both contracting
parties in retrospect, regardless of which party was responsible for including the term. So, this
factor alone is not determinative. But, the party challenging a term(s) cannot, generally speaking,
be responsible for the term(s)'s inclusion in the contract, because such a challenge by the
including party will probably fail. If the party challenging the term is responsible for its inclusion
in the contract, either because it drafted the contract or insisted on the term's inclusion therein, it
is extremely difficult to conceive of circumstances that would enable such a challenge to succeed.
Under the rules of interpretation, any ambiguity in the contract would be construed against the
drafter. Carter v. Four Seasons Funding Corp., 97 S.W.3d 387, 398 (Ark. 2003); Joyner v.
Adams, 361 S.E.2d 902, 905 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987). In addition, none of the contract policing
doctrines would be available to the party responsible for including the term, for fairly obvious
reasons. A party usually cannot harm herself, i.e., by including the "bad" terms, and then come
into court to ask for help in getting out of the bad bargain she created. Richard C. Levin & Susan
Erickson Marin, NAFTA Chapter 11: Investment and Investment Disputes, 2 NAFTA: L. & Bus.
REV. AM. 82, 102 n.87 (1996) ("As a general rule under the law of contracts, a party with
'unclean hands' may not be released unilaterally from its contract obligations to the detriment of
the other party for reasons related to its own wrongdoing."); see Kevin C. Kennedy, Equitable
Remedies and Principled Discretion: The Michigan Experience, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 609,
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So, this is how the process problem works: the burden is on the
coerced party to prove that a contract term(s) is unreasonable using one
or more of the expanded contract policing doctrines. But these contract
policing doctrines are peripheral to the core (formation) because they
are not available to the coerced party until after a contract is formed.20 8
At that point, after formation, the effect of the policing doctrines is
muted, if not barred, by practical factors, the most important of which
are (1) massive litigation costs; 20 9 (2) boilerplate clauses in standard
619 (1997) ("The clean hands maxim is most often cited in contract cases. It requires that
plaintiffs seeking equitable relief must themselves be free of any unconscionable conduct.
Application of the maxim is thus not restricted to illegal, void, or voidable transactions only.").
The contract risk allocation defenses would similarly be unavailable. Mistake, whether mutual or
unilateral, could not be argued, because the party responsible for the term's inclusion is not
mistaken as to its existence. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 151, 153 (1981).
The specific risk allocation elements of impracticability of performance and frustration of
purpose, would most likely allocate the risk of the term's inclusion to the party that was
responsible for including it in the contract. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 261, 265
(1981); Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 153 cmt. b ("The most obvious case of
allocation of the risk . . . is one in which the parties themselves provide for it by their
agreement."), 261 cmt. c (explaining that the determination of whether a party has assumed a
greater obligation depends on, among other things, "the degree to which the other party supplied
the terms") (1981). Consequently, because it is highly unlikely that the party responsible for the
inclusion of a term(s) could successfully challenge its inclusion in court, I conclude that it is
highly unlikely that the including party would be the party subsequently challenging the term.
The task, then, is to determine which party was responsible for including the term(s). We know
that coercion in the bargaining process is assumed. But coercion for what purpose? The answer
here, as before, is that coercion is employed to procure a bad bargain. In other words, the
coercion must lead to the inclusion of the term(s) that create the bad bargain. If this is not the
case, query the reason for the coercion at all. So, which party to a contract can insist on including
specific terms in the contract? The answer is the party with the ability to coerce. Hence, the
party most likely to be challenging the term(s) of a bad bargain using the contract policing
doctrines will be the coerced party.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 149-50.
209. It is very expensive to bring a lawsuit of any kind, which would obviously include one
raising the contract policing doctrines. See Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Incomplete
Contracts in a Complete Contract World, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 725, 737 (2006) ("Litigation
costs, specifically attorney fees, make it expensive to pursue a contract claim."); F. Andrew
Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275, 326 (2008)
("Lawsuits are expensive and time consuming, and therefore most individuals will not bring a suit
that has little or no potential for a damages award."); Robert Sprague & Karen L. Page, The
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and the Entrepreneur: Protecting Naive Issuers from
Sophisticated Investors, 8 WYO. L. REV. 167, 175 (2008) ("Filing a lawsuit initiates a long,
complex, and expensive process."); Michelle A. Travis et al., Dispute Resolution in Action:
Examining the Reality of Employment Discrimination Cases: Proceedings of the 2007 Annual
Meeting, Association of American Law Schools, Sections on Employment Discrimination and
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 139, 141 (2007) ("After all,
lawsuits are lengthy, expensive, and perhaps most importantly, can be psychically damaging to
litigants."); cf Steven B. Hantler et al., Is the "Crisis" in the Civil Justice System Real or
Imagined?, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1126 n.21 (2005) ("[A] survey of state courts of general
jurisdiction in nation's seventy-five largest counties found that contract cases take 21.5 months to
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form contracts, 210  such as merger clauses,211 mandatory arbitration
provisions, forum selection, and choice of law clauses;2 12 (3) federally-
imposed limits on class actions by private attorneys213 and legal service
resolve.").
210. See generally Knapp, Opting, supra note 3, at 97 (discussing increased power of form-
contract drafters); Knapp, Private, supra note 1, at 775-76 (discussing judicial deference to the
drafter); William J. Woodward, Jr., Finding the Contract in Contracts for Law, Forum and
Arbitration, 2 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1, 1 (2006) (analyzing choice-of-law and choice-of-forum
clauses in standard form contracts).
211. Merger clauses are commonly found in contract boilerplate. Charles J. Goetz & Robert
E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and
Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261, 315 n.146 (1985); Jerald Clifford McKinney, II,
Are You Trying to Imply Something?: Understanding the Various State Approaches to Implied
Covenants of Continuous Operation in Commercial Leases, 31 U. ARK. LfTTLE ROCK L. REV.
427, 502 (2009); Edith R. Warkentine, Beyond Unconscionability: The Case for Using "Knowing
Assent" as the Basis for Analyzing Unbargained-For Terms in Standard Form Contracts, 31
SEA7TLE U. L. REV. 469, 477-78 (2008). A merger clause invokes the parol evidence rule and
serves to exclude any evidence outside of the parties' written agreement. To the extent that a
coerced party's case relies on misrepresentations or statements outside of the writing, those pieces
of evidence would very likely be barred. Cf. FEINMAN, UN-MAKING, supra note 1, at 94; Knapp,
Opting, supra note 3, at 100-01.
212. All of these clauses have been upheld as valid by the courts. For examples of forum
selection clauses see: Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991); M/S Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). For examples of choice of law clauses see: Johnson v.
Ventra Group, Inc., 191 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 1999); Banek, Inc. v. Yogurt Ventures U.S.A., Inc., 6
F.3d 357 (6th Cit. 1993); Wang Labs., Inc. v. Kagan, 990 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1993); Milanovich
v. Costa Crociere, S.P.A., 954 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Interfirst Bank Clifton v. Fernandez,
853 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1988); Woods-Tucker Leasing Corp. of Ga. v. Hutcheson-Ingram Dev.
Co., 642 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1981). For examples of arbitration clauses see: Green Tree Fin.
Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513
U.S. 265 (1995); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
213. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 9-12 (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006)). In theory, the 2005 changes to the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA)
were intended to reduce the ability to bring class actions. See Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions
After the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1593, 1606 (2006) ("The effect of
CAFA will probably be to reduce the number of multistate class actions, and certainly the number
of national class actions."). Technically, it gave greater federal court jurisdiction over class
actions under diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Stephen J. Shapiro, Applying the
Jurisdictional Provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: In Search of a Sensible
Judicial, 59 BAYLOR L. REV. 77, 80 (2007).
According to the sponsors of [CAFA], the purpose of the sections expanding federal
subject matter jurisdiction was to prevent the practice used by some lawyers of
manipulating the citizenship of the named parties and/or the amount in controversy,
which made it impossible for the defendants to remove the cases from state to federal
court. This was facilitated by several long-standing interpretations of the diversity
statutes by the Supreme Court.
Id. (citations omitted). The purpose was to reduce the number of state court actions-some state
jurisdictions were very well known for their willingness to certify classes and award large
damages. Shapiro, supra at 135-36.
One of the purposes of [CAFA] was to end abuses by plaintiffs' attorneys who brought
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providers; 2 14 and, of course, (4) the practical reality that a private
attorney may not be readily available to litigate an individual claim
(either for plaintiff or defendant) where the amount at stake is small.215
Indeed, it is widely understood that courts rarely let parties out of their
contracts, regardless of the excuse advanced.216 Additionally, empirical
large nationwide class action lawsuits in a few state courts which were known to be
overly favorable to class actions. By manipulating the named parties, plaintiffs were
able to prevent these cases from being removed to federal courts.
See also 28 U.S.C. § 1711.
Abuses in class actions undermine the national judicial system, the free flow of
interstate commerce, and the concept of diversity jurisdiction as intended by the
framers of the United States Constitution, in that State and local courts are-keeping
cases of national importance out of Federal court; sometimes acting in ways that
demonstrate bias against out-of-State defendants; and making judgments that impose
their view of the law on other States and bind the rights of the residents of those States.
Id. It also sought to curtail perceived abusive cases that benefited plaintiffs' attorneys, but
conveyed minimal benefits to the class (e.g. restricting coupon settlements). See id. ("Class
members often receive little or no benefit from class actions, and are sometimes harmed, such as
where counsel are awarded large fees, while leaving class members with coupons or other awards
of little or no value."); Id. § 1712(e) (providing that coupon settlements may be approved only
after the court conducts a hearing to determine whether the settlement is "fair, reasonable, and
adequate for class members").
214. See Ilisabeth Smith Bornstein, From the Viewpoint of the Poor: An Analysis of the
Constitutionality of the Restriction on Class Action Involvement by Legal Services Attorneys,
2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 693, 693-94 (2003) (suggesting that "the class action prohibition is
unconstitutional because it represents impermissible viewpoint discrimination"); Ingrid V. Eagly,
Community Education: Creating a New Vision of Legal Services Practice, 4 CLINICAL L. REV.
433, 434, 449 (1998) (discussing limitations on kinds of activities that Legal Services attorneys
can undertake); Henry Rose, Class Actions and the Poor, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 55, 59 (2007)
(reviewing legislative history of imposing restriction on the participation of Legal Services
Attorneys in class actions).
215. See Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 454 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1217 (S.D. Fla. 2006)
("[F]ew firms, no matter how large or well financed, will have any incentive to represent the
small stake holders in class actions against corporate America, no matter how worthy the cause or
wrongful the defendant's conduct."); Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121
HARV. L. REV. 1465, 1524 (2008) ("Because 'small recoveries do not provide the incentive for
any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights,' plaintiffs with small stakes
might each have insufficient reason to hire a lawyer to vindicate their claims, even if the sum of
their claims would justify the expense of attorneys' fees." (citing Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997)) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir.
1997))); Hessick, supra note 209, at 326 ("Lawsuits are expensive and time consuming, and
therefore most individuals will not bring a suit that has little or no potential for a damages
award.").
216. Professor Robert Lloyd writes:
We spend so much time on the unusual cases where courts find a way to let people out
of their bad deals that students begin to think these cases are the norm. Students are
amazed when I tell them that it is virtually unheard of for a sophisticated party, or even
a party only moderately sophisticated, to prevail on an unconscionability argument.
Yes, you can win an unconscionability case if your client is poor and uneducated, and
if the other party is a sleazy organization that preys on poor people, and if you're able
to afford an appeal, and if you get Skelly Wright on the bench. But absent these
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studies indicate that claims based on the contract policing doctrines are
not very successful when they are asserted in court.2 17 Consequently,
the process problem will prevent a challenge to the contract terms based
on the expanded policing doctrines from going to court in the first
place218 and will cause most of these challenges to fail, even if they do
make it through the courthouse doors.2
19
circumstances, the client is going to be stuck with the documents she signs.
Robert M. Lloyd, Making Contracts Relevant: Thirteen Lessons for the First-Year Contracts
Course, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 257, 267 (2004); see also E. Allan Farnsworth, Developments in
Contract Law in the 1980's: The Top Ten, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 203, 225 (1990)
("[C]ontinued expansion of unconscionability and related doctrines did not occur in the 1980s as
expected."); Knapp, Private, supra note 1, at 775 (noting that the burden of persuasion with
respect to unconscionability claims "is at best difficult, [and] at worst literally impossible to
satisfy") (footnote omitted); Morant, MLK, supra note 22, at 110 ("The existence of... duress,
unconscionability, and undue influence cannot, by themselves, sufficiently accommodate
marketplace inequities. The very dearth of cases where individuals are successful in obtaining
relief through those devices substantiates this point. This result is compounded by the heavy
burden of proof placed upon the claimant of such relief.") (footnotes omitted). Furthermore, the
major push for expansion came in connection with commercial, rather than consumer,
transactions. Regardless, the push was, on the whole, noteworthy mainly for its lack of success.
See Robert A. Hillman, Contract Excuse and Bankruptcy Discharge, 43 STAN. L. REV. 99, 99
(1990) ("Notwithstanding academic writing that reports or urges expansion of the grounds of
excuse, courts actually remain extremely reluctant to release parties from their obligations.")
(footnote omitted).
217. See, e.g., DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 7, at 1097 ("Data revealed that in only 37.8% (56
out of 148) of the cases sampled unconscionability was found."); Grace M. Giesel, A Realistic
Proposal for the Contract Duress Doctrine, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 443, 463-65 (2005) (examining
published state cases from 1996 through 2003 and finding that in "only nine of the eighty-eight
[duress] cases did the court decide the matter in favor of the duress claim"; of those nine cases, an
appellate court affirmed a lower court's finding of duress in only two cases.).
218. This is because of (a) the huge costs of litigation, which are compounded by choice of
forum clauses that could very well require litigation in a foreign state; (b) the amended class
action rules; and (c) the practical reality that a private attorney probably would not take such
small claims, especially if those claims have a low probability of success. Mandatory arbitration
provisions would, of course, also prevent such challenges from being litigated in court. These
challenges would be heard, however, in the arbitration proceeding. But, because arbitration also
suffers from the problems just mentioned (i.e., costs, limited availability of class actions, and
unavailability of private attorneys), the result would probably be the same-the challenge would
not be brought in arbitration either. See FEINMAN, UN-MAKING, supra note 1, at 99-108;
Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility: Empirical Evidence, 41 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 813, 814 (2008) (arguing that arbitration costs are the same or even higher
than litigation costs); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme
Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 637, 638 (1996) (criticizing
judicial preference for mandatory binding arbitration); Jean R. Stemlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen,
Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or
Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75 (2004) (discussing that majority of
standard form contracts impose on consumers arbitration clauses and prohibitions on class
actions).
219. This is because of choice of law clauses, which usually adopt the law of a non-consumer
friendly state to govern the dispute, and the fact that the empirical studies indicate that challenges
based on contract policing doctrines, like duress and unconscionability, usually fail. See William
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
The practical consequence of all of this is that the presumption of
validity that arises upon formation of the contract extends to both the
contract and all the terms of that contract as well. More specifically, an
objective manifestation of mutual assent to all the modem forms of
contracting-i.e., standard forms, rolling contracts, click, shrink, or
browse wrap contracts, etc.-becomes assent to both the reasonable and
unreasonable terms in those contracts. Practically speaking, therefore,
"being bound" to the contract in the first sense means that all of the
terms of the contract will likely be binding against the coerced party. 220
"Being bound" to the contract, however, does not end with the
presumption of validity; it has a second component. Assuming that the
contract is valid, either because the presumption of validity was not
challenged or such a challenge failed, the state will enforce the rights
expressed in that contract by literally putting the sovereign power of the
state in the service of one contracting party against the other.221 The
state accomplishes this by compelling one of the parties (through its
judges, sheriffs, and other agents) to either pay to get out of the contract
or perform. 222
Thus, power in contracting is in the core-formation. Power is in the
core, because the state binds the contracting parties to the contract upon
formation by creating the presumption of contract (and term) validity
and then by agreeing to step in to enforce that contract.
5. By Leaving the Core Intact, Modem Contract Law Expands and
Then Immunizes Coercion
There are two points worth emphasizing in this last part of my
argument, both of which follow from the previous four sections. First,
leaving formation completely intact and making it easier to form a
contract expands one party's capacity for coercion. This is because
formation, particularly mutual assent, is where the party with the
capacity to coerce imposes the contract terms that it wants, either
through some type of negotiation process or through the use of its
J. Woodward, Jr., Constraining Opt-Outs: Shielding Local Law and Those It Protects From
Adhesive Choice of Law Clauses, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 9, 11 (2006) (discussing failure of
legislature to unify the law regarding "the protective rules different states apply to business
relationships that form between businesses and individuals").
220. Cf. Knapp, Opting, supra note 3, at 102 (discussing why the "adhering party" would be
bound by all the terms of a written agreement, including any applicable default provisions).
Knapp's "adhering party" would be the equivalent of my "coerced party."
221. See supra note 83.
222. See supra note 83.
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standard form.2 23  Then, upon formation, the presumption of contract
(and term) validity springs up, to the benefit of the coercing party. 224
The easier it is to form a contract, therefore, the easier it is for the
coercing party to obtain the presumption of contract validity. Obtaining
this presumption is very important to the coercing party because the
burden of rebutting the presumption is then imposed on the coerced
party, using one or more of the contract policing doctrines.225  It is
extremely difficult to overcome the presumption of contract validity in
practice because of the process problem associated with bringing such a
challenge. 226 Consequently, the difficulty faced by the coerced party in
disproving the presumption of contract validity could conceivably give
the party with coercive capacity greater license (if not perverse
incentive) to impose more onerous and/or one-sided terms during
contract formation.
Finally, and specifically because the process problem makes it so
difficult to rebut the presumption of contract validity in practice, this
presumption essentially immunizes the coercion taking place during the
bargaining process from effective challenge by modem contract's
expanded policing doctrines. 227 This is because a challenge (either by
claim or defense) to the contract based on modem contract's expanded
policing doctrines would most likely be unsuccessful, either because it
was not asserted or because the challenge failed.
Existing consumer credit products,228 like payday loans,229 fee
harvester cards, 230 refund anticipation loans,231 generic credit cards,2 32
223. See supra Part II.B (discussing modem contract and conventional wisdom).
224. See supra Part II.B.
225. See supra Part II.B (discussing modem contract and conventional wisdom).
226. See supra Part lI.B.
227. See FEINMAN, UNMAKING, supra note 1, at 16-17.
The practical consequence of the implementation of [a formalist] vision is that
businesses can use contract law more effectively to control relationships with their
customers and employees because they can more easily dictate the terms of dealing,
avoid being legally bound except on their own terms, avoid review by the courts of the
fairness of those terms, and control how disputes are resolved under their contracts.
Id.
228. "Credit products" are a species of contract. See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren,
Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2008) ("[C]reditors often design dangerous
contracts as a strategic response to consumers' underestimation of the risks that these contracts-
products entail.").
229. A payday loan is a small, short-term loan or cash advance offered at a fee. Bar-Gill &
Warren, supra note 228, at 44. "In a typical transaction, a consumer might pay a $30 fee for a
two-week $200 cash advance . . . . In the typical payday loan described above, the $30 fee
corresponds to an annual interest rate of almost 400%." Id.
230. A "fee-harvester card" is a credit card that comes "with enormous fees and tiny credit
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and subprime mortgages 233 provide ample evidence that contracts with
onerous, one-sided terms, already abound. And to the extent that
coercion is present in the formation of any of these contracts, they
present a very real problem for the modem contract law system.
Unfortunately, they present a problem that modem contract law, at least
as presently constructed, will not be able to remedy effectively using its
expanded policing doctrines.
IV. CONCLUSION
Conventional wisdom says that modem contract law evolved to
remedy problems left unaddressed by the classical contract law
lines;" the fees are incurred upon the credit card holder's first use of the card. Fee-Harvesters:
Low-Credit, High-Cost Cards Bleed Consumers, NAT'L CONSUMER L. REP., Nov. 2007, at 5-6.
The fees essentially "eat up" all of the credit made available on the card. Id. at 4. The National
Consumer Law Center Report provides the following example of how fee-harvester cards
basically work:
[Olne of the fee-harvester cards featured in this report comes with a credit limit of
$250. However, the consumer who signs up for this card will automatically incur a
$95 program fee, a $29 account set-up fee, a $6 monthly participation fee, and a $48
annual fee-an instant debt of $178 and buying power of only $72.
Id.
231. A refund anticipation loan ("RAL") is a bank loan secured by a taxpayer's expected tax
refund. See Press Release, National Consumer Law Center and Consumer Federation of
America, Consumers Urged to Keep More of Their Tax Refunds by Avoiding Quickie Loans
(Jan. 21, 2009) (on file with author). Such loans usually last between 7-14 days, until the
taxpayer's IRS refund arrives and the taxpayer repays the loan. Id. Approximately "8.67 million
taxpayers received an RAL in the 2007 tax filing season (for tax year 2006)." Id. The typical
RAL has several fees built into it, including loan fees (ranging from $34 to $134), and add-on
fees (ranging from $25 to several hundred dollars). Id. Probably the most shocking cost of an
RAL is the effective annual interest rate ("APR") charged by the lenders, which range from
approximately 50% to almost 500%. Id. If, however, an add-on fee of $40 is charged and added
to the calculation, the effective APRs on a given RAL increases and can range from 85% to
almost 1,300%. Id.
232. One-sided terms imposed in credit cards include, but are not limited to: universal default
provisions, any-time interest rate changes, penalty fees, additional fees (including risk-related,
convenience and service fees), and other technical features, including "low (and even negative)
amortization rates, compounded interest, pro-issuer payment allocation methods [i.e., payments
are allocated first to low APR balances], and balance-computation methods [i.e., two-cycle
billing]." Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 228, at 52 (footnotes omitted). The magnitude of these
terms can be illustrated by way of a quick example. In 2004, credit card companies collected $24
billion in fees from U.S. card holders. Id. at 47. "[P]enalty fees totaled $13 billion a year and
accounted for 12.5% of issuers' revenues." Id. (footnotes omitted).
233. A subprime mortgage is a loan instrument sold to subprime borrowers, which are
borrowers who have a heightened perceived risk of default. Studies show that significant
percentages of borrowers (with estimates ranging from 35%-60%, depending on the study) were
sold subprime mortgages when they could have qualified for prime mortgages. Bar-Gill &
Warren, supra note 228, at 38-39. As a result, these borrowers overpay, because of fees and
interest rates, "on average $3,370 per subprime loan household per year." Id. at 40-41.
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system.234  Thus, modern contract law is different from classical
contract in ways that make the current system work better than the older
regime.235 The differences between the two systems are therefore the
most important part of the contract evolutionary story. 236 Of course,
whether this conventional wisdom is true turns on whether modern
contract has been successful in correcting the problems produced by the
classical system.
The modern contract law system identified coercion during contract
formation that produces a bad bargain as a problem left unaddressed by
the classical system; the creation of contract policing doctrines was a
solution to this problem.237  But, as this Article demonstrates, the
expanded contract policing doctrines are inadequate to the task set for
them. This is because they are peripheral to the core of contract, which
is formation; and formation is where power in contracting emanates and
then becomes entrenched. Modern contract law will, therefore, be
largely unsuccessful in eliminating, or even tempering, the coercion
problem it believes was created (or ignored) under the classical system.
Indeed, the modern contract law system will also likely make this
problem worse.
Consequently, the conventional wisdom, which says that modern
contract law is different from classical contract in ways that make the
current system work better than the older regime,238 is wrong. Instead,
the ways in which the two systems are the same are more critical
because it is the sameness between the two systems that predisposes
modern contract law to fail. And, because the conventional wisdom is
wrong, one can argue that at least parts of modern contract law are no
better than the classical contract system that it ostensibly replaced,
because the problems it perceived in the classical system remain.
I am not suggesting that we do away with contract law. I am not sure
we could, even if we wanted to. But if conventional contract law
wisdom embodies the way we believe contract law works (or should
work), the fact that the conventional wisdom is wrong strongly suggests
that modern contract law cannot work the way we ourselves assert that
234. Feinman, Critical, supra note 2, at 830-39; Feinman, Revival, supra note 1, at 12-14;
Knapp, Offer, supra note 2, at 317-19; Morant, Race, supra note 2, at 900; cf Eisenberg,
Dynamic, supra note 2, at 1753-54.
235. Eisenberg, Dynamic, supra note 2, at 1753-54.
236. FEINMAN, UN-MAKING, supra note 1, at 12-14; Knapp, Offer, supra note 2, at 316-19;
Morant, Race, supra note 2, at 900; Speidel, supra note 2, at 260-61.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 6-22.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 1-5.
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it should. And this result should matter.239 If modem contract law
cannot work on its own terms, 240 we either need to change the rules or
come up with a different way to explain away or justify this result.
239. The sentiments Professor Charles Knapp expressed twenty-five years ago still resonate
today. He wrote:
[T]here is a deep and unresolved conflict at the heart of what we call "Contract Law," a
conflict visible in the variety of views advanced, particularly in recent years, by the
Contracts "theorists." At its most fundamental level, this can be described as the
divergence between those who see the decision to enforce promissory obligations as
primarily an expression of moral values, and those who see it as promoting market
efficiency. One might, of course, conclude that (a) either point of view is in any case
only a rationalization for the system we have, rather than an explanation of why we
have it, or that (b) whether one holds one point of view or the other is really of little
importance, since most case outcomes can be defended and/or attacked by persons
holding either view. Both of these observations have more than a grain of truth in
them. Therefore, does a choice at the theoretical level really matter? Ultimately it
does, if only as a symbolic expression of the values of the society which has created,
and is served by, "the law."
Knapp, Future, supra note 156, at 949-50.
240. Mensch, Ideology, supra note 34, at 770 ("New legal categories do not solve old
problems, which lie deep in our structures of economic and political thought. They only express
them differently.").
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